Ballistic missile defense and NATO alliance relations by Raffier, John P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1996-12
Ballistic missile defense and NATO alliance relations
Raffier, John P.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32034
'4 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
BALLISTIC :MISSILE DEFENSE 
AND NATO ALLIANCE RELATIONS 
by 
John P. Raffier 
December 1996 
Thesis Advisor: Peter R. Lavoy 
Approved for public release; distribution is un1imited. 
,. 
I 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for m.iewing instnlction, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and m.iewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports, 1215 Jefferson Da~ Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washingtott_DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 1996 Master's Thesis 
4. TilLE AND SUBTIILE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND NATO 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
ALLIANCE RELATIONS 
6. AU1HOR(S) Ra:ffi.er, John P. 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONNAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING 
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION 
Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER
 ~ 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCYNAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORlNG/MONITO!ill/G 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBh'R 
11. SUPPlEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DIS1RIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A~roved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABS'IRACT (maximum 200 words) 
Short-range missiles in Third World arsenals pose a serious threat to forward-deployed U.S. and allied 
military forces. The acquisition of longer-range missiles has the potential to extend that threat to the population 
and territory of the United States and its allies. While NATO member states have agreed to develop Theater 
Missile Defense (TMD) systems to support forward-deployed troops, they continue to dispute which TMD systems i 
ought to be developed and whether territorial or population defenses ought to be built. In this long-standing · 
dispute, the United States has often found itself at odds with its European allies. 
This thesis argues that ballistic missile defense remains a potential source of friction between the United 
States and its European allies, but for substantially different reasons than in the Cold War era. The strategic and l 
political differences which alienated allies during the Cold War have been replaced by economic considerations 
and the inability to develop a unified B:MD strategy. These factors continue to make BMD a divisive issue. To 
prevent the erosion of Alliance relations, the United States must show greater sensitivity to the interests of its 
European allies, who in turn must exhibit a greater commitment to NATO goals. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Ballistic Missile Defense, NATO policy, deterrence, Alliance 15. NUMBER OF 
cohsion PAGES 
134 
16. PRICE CODE 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATION OF 
TION OF REPORT CATION OF TillS PAGE TION OF ABS1RACT ABS'IRACT 
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 
i 
, DTIC QUAI..I'.r'Y llJSPE{JTED 8 
11 
Author: 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
AND NATO ALLIANCE RELATIONS 
John P. Raffier 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., College of the Holy Cross, 1990 
Submitted in partial fi1lfil1ment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 1996 
Approved by: 
Frank C. Petho, Acting Chairman 




Short-range missiles in Third World arsenals pose a serious threat to forward-
deployed U.S. and allied military forces. The acquisition oflonger-range missiles has the 
potential to extend that threat to the population and territory of the United States ancf its 
allies. While NATO member states have agreed to develop Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) systems to support forward-deployed troops, they continue to dispute which TMD 
systems ought to be developed and whether territorial or population defenses ought to be 
built. In this long-standing dispute, the United States has often found itself at odds with 
its European allies. 
This thesis argues that ballistic missile defense remains a potential source of 
friction between the United States and its European allies, but for substantially different 
reasons than in the Cold War era. The strategic and political differences which alienated 
allies during the Cold War have been replaced by economic considerations and the inability 
to develop a unified BMD strategy. These factors continue to make BMD a divisive issue. 
To prevent the erosion of Alliance relations, the United States must show greater 
sensitivity to the interests of its European allies, who in tum must exhibit a greater 
commitment to NATO goals. 
v 
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The proliferation of weapons of mass· destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles has 
become an issue of increasing concern in the post-Cold War era. NATO has devoted 
considerable resources to assess the threat that WMD proliferation poses to the Alliance 
and to identify ways to reduce that threat. The June 1994 Alliance Policy Framework on 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction identified the dual-approach strategy that 
NATO would use to defend member states: first, through political means to prevent 
proliferation and second, through defensive means to protect NATO territory and forces. 
On 29 November 1995, NATO's Response to Proliferation ofWeapons ofMass 
Destruction defined the specific means to achieve NATO's goals. Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) for deployed forces was one of the capabilities to be developed. 
Even though NATO member states have agreed on the need to develop TMD for 
deployed troops, no similar consensus has emerged on the means to develop TMD or 
regarding territorial or population defenses. This thesis asserts that ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) has been, and remains today a source of contention between the United 
States and its NATO allies. The friction between allies generated by the BMD issue 
weakens Alliance relations and erodes the level of transatlantic cooperation. The nature of 
this tension, however, has shifted from significant strategic disagreements during the Cold 
War, to economic considerations and the inability to develop a unified BMD strategy. 
To demonstrate how divisive an issue BMD is, this thesis examines the missile 
defense debate throughout its forty-year history in the United States, and identifies the 
IX 
primary controversies, policy decisions, and specific events that affected U.S. relations 
with Europe. This study focuses on Great Britain, France, and Germany, and analyzes the 
impact ofBMD on the relationship of each country with the United States. To emphasize 
the changing nature of the missile defense debate, a comparison is made between Alliance 
relations during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era. The Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) increased tension between the United States and other members of the 
Alliance, largely because it threatened NATO's traditional nuclear deterrence strategy. 
In the post-Cold War period, greater allied consensus on BMD has failed to yield a 
more cooperative approach to developing the necessary technology. European partners 
still appear unable to reconcile BMD with national needs and unwilling to commit scarce 
resources to support NATO goals. As a result, friction between Alliance members 
regarding missile defense might lead to· an inability to reach consensus on other vital 




A. THESIS ARGUMENT 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver 
them (notably, ballistic missiles) was largely overshadowed by the strategic stalemate of 
the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the concern over a future missile 
attack by potential adversaries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, or North Korea has increased 
dramatically. Today, over thirty countries possess ballistic missiles and more than twenty-
five are believed to be developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. 
1 The majority 
of Third World arsenals are comprised of short-range ballistic missiles, which, in 
themselves, pose a serious threat to forward-deployed U.S. and allied military forces. The 
acquisition oflonger-range missiles continues, however, and the potential threat to the 
population and territory of the United States and its allies draws nearer each day. 
While consensus has been reached by NATO member states on the need to 
develop Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems to provide support for deployed troops, 
unanimity has not been achieved on the means to develop TMD or regarding territorial or 
population defenses. U.S. policy makers have taken the lead in addressing this emerging 
threat from the South, in the form of a more focused Ballistic Missile Defense (B:MD) 
program. The B:MD debate in the United States has been going on for nearly thirty years, 
and at various times throughout the period U.S. B:MD programs have caused significant 
strain between the United States and its NATO allies. 
1 Senator Jesse Helms, speech on the Strategic Anti-Missile Revitalizat:on Act of 1996, U.S. 
Senate, 104th Cong., Congressional Record (6 February 1996), S 917. 
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This thesis argues that ballistic missile defense remains a potential source of 
friction between the United States and its European allies, but for substantially different 
reasons than in the Cold War era. The strategic and political differences which alienated 
allies during the Cold War have been replaced by economic considerations and the inability 
to develop a unified BMD strategy. These issues continue to make BMD a divisive issue. 
As a result, friction in this one specific area of defense may erode the level of transatlantic 
cooperation and weaken Alliance relations. 
During the Cold War, the development of a common NATO BMD policy was 
extremely difficult due to the differing opinions held by Alliance members on mutually 
assured destruction, detente, arms control, and nuclear deterrence. In particular, the 
1980s debate involving the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) highlighted the divergent 
strategic goals of the United States and its European partners. The United States forced 
its allies to choose between cooperation and confrontation, and the result was criticism, 
resentment, hostility, and eventually, some limited, reluctant support. The SDI was a 
source of friction between allies because of the strategic and political differences of the 
member states. 
European governments now offer a much more supportive position on the need to 
consider missile defense. At the same time, these governments have demonstrated an 
inability or unwillingness to commit to BMD policies which support the efforts of the 
United States and common goals ofNATO. Economic difficulties and the reluctance to 
depart from some Cold War policies continue to prohibit the development of a unified 
NATO program. The inability to reach a consensus on BMD will ultimately affect other 
2 
NATO considerations, including the decision to deploy forces and burden-sharing 
arrangements for European defense. 
B. BACKGROUND ON NATO POLICY 
On 9 June 1994, NATO Ministers officially detailed the WMD threat in the 
Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this 
document a threat assessment was outlined in order to define current and future WMD 
and missile proliferation risks. Based on this definition of risks, and NATO's 
responsibility to defend member states while sustaining a stable European security 
environment, a dual-approach strategy was discussed. First, politically, the goal of the· 
Alliance and its member states would be to prevent proliferation, or reverse it through 
diplomatic means. Assisting current nonproliferation efforts without duplication of 
tasking was an emphasis. The second strategy would be a defensive analysis to determine 
the steps necessary to ensure the security of the members' territories and NATO forces 
against potential WMD proliferation. 
On 29 November 1995, NATO officials further delineated their strategy in 
NATO's Response to Proliferation ofWeapons of Mass Destruction. Specific courses of 
action were laid out and the capabilities required for NATO's successful efforts against 
proliferation were highlighted. More than just an organizational condemnation ofWMD 
proliferation, this message established the groundwork for a realistic and attainable plan of 
attack. One of the capabilities to be developed was "Extended Air Defence, including 
Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence for Deployed Forces."2 
2 NATO's Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 4. 
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C. THESIS ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is organized to facilitate an understanding of the issues related to BMD 
that cause tension between the United States and its allies. Chapter II traces the historical 
evolution of the U.S. BMD program through four distinct periods: 
1.) 1945-1972: Origins of the U.S. BMD program 
2.) 1972-1983: ABM Treaty; mutual vulnerability embraced by NATO 
3.) 1983-1990: The Strategic Defense Initiative debate 
4.) 1990-present: The Post-Cold War environment. 
Examining the evolution ofBMD in the United States makes it possible to better 
understand the primary issues involved in the U.S. debate and also establishes the 
historical framework within which current U.S. policy makers operate in the drive to 
implement more advanced BMD technology. 
Chapters III, IV, and V explore the relationship between the United States and the 
three strongest European members of the Atlantic Alliance: Great Britain, France, and 
Germany. Each chapter focuses on an individual country to illustrate how U.S. BMD 
programs, and ballistic missile defense in general, have impacted it and its relations with 
the United States. The debate surrounding the SDI is used to identify European reaction 
to a U.S. program during the height of the Cold War. The SDI was chosen due to the 
intensity of the controversy, and the direct involvement of the Europeans in the debate. 
The post-Cold War section of each chapter involves a survey of the developing attitudes 
towards missile defense of each government over the last six years. While post-Cold War 
European policies have yet to be clearly defined by each government, significant findings 
can be inferred from the available data, especially in comparison to the SDI debate. 
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Great Britain, France, and Germany were chosen for two primary reasons. First, 
as the three strongest European members ofNATO, they possess an overwhelming 
influence on the other members of the Alliance. Because of this, the state of relations 
between the United States and these three countries has a direct impact on the overall 
unity of the organization. Second, each nation is unique with regard to deterrence, 
nuclear strategy, and European security. Great Britain has long been the closest ally of the 
United States, and has had to balance its strong transatlantic ties with a growing 
attachment to continental Europe. Also, its nuclear deterrent force has always been 
closely linked to that of the United States. France, outside ofNATO's integrated military 
structure, has developed its nuclear force and strategy independently, and has continually 
sought to emphasize that independence from the United States. Germany, the non-nuclear 
power, has relied heavily on the extended nuclear deterrence policy ofNATO, and 
particularly, the United States, while attempting to groom positive diplomatic and 
economic relations with its neighbors to the East. The diversity of security perceptions 
and requirements poses a serious challenge to U.S. policy makers striving to increase U.S. 
security without sacrificing the unified support of European allies. 
Finally, in Chapter VI, an evaluation is presented which draws on the above data to 
summarize the interaction of Europe and U.S. BMD during the Cold War and in the post-
Cold War period. By highlighting these similarities and differences, policy makers may be 
able to tailor future BMD efforts to minimize damage to Alliance cohesion while 
maximizing defense capabilities to meet a ballistic missile threat. 
5 
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ll. THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. BALLISTIC 
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most acrimonious national security debates in the United States over 
the past thirty years has involved ballistic missile defense (B:MD). Throughout those 
years, the military and political effects of deploying ballistic missile defenses have been 
hotly contested, and the matter has never been adequately resolved. The attention of U.S. 
policy makers is once again fixed on BMD. This is so for two reasons. First, geopolitical 
changes, primarily the end of the Cold War, have altered the appearance of the global 
strategic balance which typified the previous forty years, and reduced the perceived danger 
of the East-West security threat. Second, the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile technology throughout the Third World has 
increased concern over a burgeoning North-South security challenge. 
While the end ofthe Cold War and the emergence of several potentially 
threatening nations are new factors to be included in the BMD debate, many of the 
arguments for and against BMD deployment have remained constant. The key bone of 
contention continues to be whether the development and deployment ofBMD technology 
will strengthen the security of the United States, or whether it will erode its current level 
of security. Since the formation of NATO, U.S. security has been closely linked to 
European defense, and U.S. policy decisions can ultimately affect Europe. Over the past 
thirty years, U.S. BMD policies have been implemented without full consideration of the 
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impact on allies, and as a result, U.S. decisions have at times adversely affected Alliance 
relations. 
This chapter explores the primary debates regarding this defense and will examine 
the evolution of the U.S. ballistic missile defense program. The development ofU.S. 
BMD efforts can be broken down into four distinct periods: (1) from the earliest concepts 
ofBMD during the Second World War up to 1972, a period in which the Sentinel and 
Safeguard BMD systems were proposed; (2) 1972 to 1983, the implementation period of 
the ABM Treaty; (3) 1983-1990, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) debate; and (4) 
1990 to the present, representing a post-Cold War, multipolar scenario. The BMD debate 
illustrates how U.S. decisions have affected European allies. 
B. THE ORIGINS OF U.S. BMD: .1945 TO 1972 
1. Early Development 
The origin ofthe U.S. missile defense program dates back to 1945 and concern 
over the highly effective German V-2 missile, first used on 8 September, 1944 on a Paris 
suburb. Military planners were convinced that this new threat warranted study, and 
contracted the General Electric Company to examine defense options. The conclusions of 
the General Electric Project Thumper stated that current technological capability was 
inadequate to meet the V-2 threat, and that no reliable defense against missile attack was 
possible. Weaknesses in radar, data-processing, and missile guidance systems prohibited 
the development of an effective system. 3 
~enson D. Adams, "The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM): A Study of the Effects of Strategic 
Weapons Technology on the Political System" (Ph. D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1968), 66. 
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Immediately following the war, the United States emphasized the use of heavy 
bombers as its main deterrent force. The belief that Soviet forces were configured in a 
similar fashion led missile researchers to emphasize anti-aircraft defenses. The absence of 
an immediate ballistic missile threat to the United States and strong memories of the 
damage wrought on U.S. warships by Japanese kamikaze attacks were also influential 
factors in the decision to give priority to anti-aircraft missile development, including 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). By the mid-1950s several SAM systems were deployed in 
both land- and sea-based systems, and it was from this technology that future BMD 
programs developed. 4 
By 1955 advances in several areas of technology suggested the need to reassess 
the potential effectiveness of a missile defense system. Both the Air Force and the Army 
initiated new studies which concluded that missile interception was no longer beyond the 
realm of possibility and that continued research could lead to a deployable defense. Based 
on these conclusions, the Department of Defense established the Nike-Zeus missile 
defense program. Consisting of a series of separate radars and the three-stage Zeus 
missile, this BMD research program operated from 1955 to 1963, and grew in importance 
following the successful Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in 1957.5 
By the tum of the decade, research in the Nike-Zeus program had developed to the 
point where a functioning model was produced and prepared for testing. The system was 
installed on the K wajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, and in July 1962 successfully 
4 Ibid, 68. 
5 Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues, (GAQ-NSIAD-93-229, July 16, 1993), 
16. 
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intercepted an ICBM launched from Vandenburg Air Force Base in California, well over 
four thousand miles away.6 That successful test was followed by eleven similar successes 
over the next year, demonstrating that the necessary technology was indeed available. 
Still, the interception of a single missile in a testing environment was by no means an 
indication that an effective BMD system was ready for deployment in the near future. 
Technical difficulties still posed limitations and the Nike-Zeus system was deemed 
inadequate to meet the growing Soviet missile threat. Rather than scrapping the program 
altogether, the Department of Defense chose to alter the make-up of the Nike-Zeus system 
by incorporating advanced radars and additional missile systems into the existing 
framework. Research continued but a decision on deployment was delayed indefinitely.7 
The new program, renamed Nike-:X, emphasized radar improvements in 
acquisition, discrimination, tracking, and interceptor guidance, all relatively ineffective 
aspects of the Nike-Zeus system. The Zeus missile was upgraded to the Spartan missile, 
capable of intercepting ICBMs outside of the Earth's atmosphere at altitudes of seventy to 
one hundred miles. The Sprint missile was added to destroy warheads at a lower altitude 
of twenty to thirty miles. Both the Sprint and Spartan missiles were themselves carrying 
nuclear warheads, and the introduction of the Sprint missile caused additional problems 
for future deployments. While the likelihood of successful interception improved due to 
its relatively low intercept altitude, the issue of radioactive fallout became a major 
concern. In 1964, Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara indicated that: 
6 Donald Baucom, The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1992), 17. 
7 Benson D. Adams, "McNamara's ABM Policy, 1961-1967," Orbis 12, no. 1 (Spring 1968): 
203. 
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The effectiveness of an active ballistic missile defense system in saving lives 
depends in large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defense system. 
Indeed, in the absence of adequate fallout shelters, an active defense might 
not significantly increase the proportion of the population surviving an 
all-out nuclear attack. 8 
At the time, the civil defense infrastructure was by no means capable of offering the 
protection which McNamara envisioned, and there were still many questions to be 
addressed prior to deployment. 
2. Influences on the Missile Defense Debate 
Throughout the mid-1960s, the technological developments in the field, the 
successful intercept tests at the Kwajalein Atoll, and the increasing acceptance of the 
feasibility of effective missile defense each contributed to other concerns outside the 
technical area. In the magazine Missiles and Rocket~ the political utility ofBMD was 
questioned by an unnamed Washington official, who asked, "Even if we can develop an 
effective ballistic missile defense system, should we deploy it?"9 Assuming that the 
strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was the basis for a stable U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
security relationship, a growing number ofBMD critics opposed the deployment as a 
destabilizing force. They argued that BMD deployment would initiate yet another arms 
race, and would reduce national security. Advocates ofBMD, on the other hand, argued 
that effective missile defenses would increase security and provide a shield under which 
offensive systems could be reduced. With technical impediments being overcome, the 
political challenges ofballistic missile defense began to increase. 
8 McNamara cited in Adams, "The Anti-Ballistic Missile," 166. 
9 James Trainor, "Nike-X Fate Keyed to DoD Study," Missiles and Rockets, 18 May 1964, p. 14. 
11 
By 1967 three developments led to yet another review of the feasibility and 
desirability of deploying a BMD system. First, improvements in long-range interceptor 
technology dramatically altered the conditions under which a BMD system could operate. 
The newest technology greatly improved the likelihood of intercepting ballistic missiles 
outside of the Earth's atmosphere, thus thwarting decoys or penetration aids which 
interfered primarily with lower altitude interceptors. Additionally, the greater distance 
would reduce the number of anti-missile missiles necessary to provide a defense, allow for 
a -greater area of coverage, and reduce the overall cost of a system. The problems 
associated with fallout resulting from low altitude intercepts became less significant, and 
the overall program was considerably more palatable. 10 
Second, beginning in October 1964, the People's Republic of China had conducted 
a series of nuclear tests, demonstrating its increasingly advanced technical abilities. By 
1967, the Chinese were testing short-range missiles, and U.S. leaders were wary that 
Chinese ICBM capabilities were estimated to be only seven or eight years away. 
Supporters of missile defense emphasized the utility of a system which could address the 
limited Chinese missile capability, or even the emergence of other, small nuclear powers. 
It was unclear to policy makers how the MAD strategy, which appeared to be successful 
in deterring the Soviets, would affect the Chinese, and an ability to minimize or prevent 
damage from a small nuclear strike was appealing. 11 
10 J. I. Coffey, "The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate," Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (April1967): 403-
404. 
JJ Ibid., 404. 
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Third, while the United States continued to conduct research, it appeared that the 
Soviets had proceeded to deploy one or more B:MD systems. The inability to obtain 
accurate intelligence, a problem that had plagued the United States throughout the Soviet 
nuclear development program, continued to force policy makers to rely on speculation, 
and the extent of Soviet defenses remained largely unknown. Some sources indicated that 
only a limited BMD system existed, protecting Moscow, while others suggested the 
existence of a much larger, nationwide system. 12 In either case, Soviet deployment had, at 
a· minimum, a psychological impact on U.S. leaders. 
3. The Sentinel Program 
As a result ofthese developments, on 18 September 1967 Secretary ofDefense 
McNamara announced the decision by the Johnson administration to deploy a BMD 
system. The Sentinel program, based largely on Nike-X components and technology, was 
designed to be a seventeen-site defensive shield ofU.S. urban-industrial areas. It was to 
be a ''thin" BMD system, deployed to address only a limited nuclear threat, primarily that 
posed by the People's Republic of China, but also to protect against an accidental or 
unauthorized Soviet launch. 13 Following this announcement, the Johnson administration 
made several attempts to reassure the Soviet Union that the Sentinel system was in no way 
a threat to Soviet security and should not alter the security environment. The decision to 
deploy sparked intense debate in scientific, military, and political communities and 
represented the culmination of over a decade of increasing controversy. 
12 Baucom, 30. 
13 Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues, 17. 
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Opposition to the Sentinel BMD system came from those who viewed deploying 
any variety of a national missile defense as a greater danger to national security than not 
deploying a system. Even though Sentinel was initially planned as a ''thin" system, to 
operate against a limited threat, critics believed that as Chinese technology advanced and 
the size of their arsenal increased, the U.S. missile defense would need substantial 
upgrades and expansion. Those of this opinion believed that Sentinel would ultimately 
have a direct impact on Soviet offensive missile capability, regardless of what the Johnson 
aaministration intended. Ironically, supporters of the Sentinel BMD system also believed 
that the ''thin" anti-missile system would need to be expanded to meet a growing threat 
from China, and saw this as a positive, not negative result. Discussion on the Sentinel 
system, always described by government officials as defense against a Chinese threat, 
usually returned to the impact the system would have on Soviet forces. 
The Johnson administration hoped that the deployment of this system would serve 
as a deterrent to China, and convince that government that the development oflong-range 
ballistic missiles would serve no strategic purpose. With a defensive system already in 
place, U.S. officials concluded that China would review its policy and see the futility of 
continuing with a costly missile development program. For BMD skeptics, it was 
questionable whether the Chinese government would see things quite the same way. 
Rather than pursue ICBMs, it was possible that research in China would shift to delivery 
systems that would simply avoid the U.S. BMD system, designed to meet the majority of 
missiles beyond the Earth's atmosphere. For example, the development of submarine-
launched missiles, which could approach the coastline of the United States prior to launch 
14 
could circumvent the Sentinel system. 14
 Such a shift would merely change the nature of 
the threat, not eliminate it. 
While some argued that any defense that saves lives should be implemented, critics 
disagreed. The system would be extremely expensive, its effectiveness could never truly 
be tested until a nuclear attack occurred, and its capabilities would forever be challenged 
by technological advances. Critics argued that all a B.:MD system could do was to force an 
enemy to invest a greater amount of resources to improve or expand its offensive 
capability. As one Department ofDefense expert remarked, "any defensive system can 
really do no more than to raise the entrance price which an attacker must pay in order to 
destroy a target. " 15 Critics believed that an arms race would be the inevitable result of the 
Sentinel deployment, as adversaries sought to overcome U.S. defenses, and any future 
hopes for arms control initiatives would be impossible. 
The timing of Secretary ofDefense McNamara's announcement also led critics to 
suggest that the Sentinel missile defense had nothing to do with national security, and was, 
instead politically motivated. News of Soviet missile defenses protecting the people of 
Moscow, the initial domestic problems resulting from increased involvement in Vietnam, 
and the upcoming presidential election might have had a significant influence on President 
Johnson's decision. 16 In fact, in 1966, one unnamed official in the Johnson administration 
is reported to have stated that the President "could be crucified politically ... for sitting on 
14 Coffey, 407. 
15 Charles Herzfeld, "HMO and National Security," Survival 31, no. 1 (March 1966): 74. 
16 Robert Rothstein, "The ABM, Proliferation and International Stability," Foreign Affairs 46, 
no. 3 (Aprill968): 489-90. 
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his hands while the Russians provide a defense for their people."17 Critics warned that the 
decision had been made by an administration pressured to respond to domestic concerns, 
without examining the full range of strategic ramifications. 
BMD advocates expressed concerns over additional countries obtaining nuclear 
and ICBM capabilities, or even the possibility of an anonymous attack being launched on 
the United States. In either case, the current U.S. deterrence policy would have been 
inadequate for preventing an attack, while a missile defense might have been the only 
practical method of preventing or reducing damage to U.S. territory. An active defense 
capable of intercepting an accidental or unauthorized launch from the Soviet Union also 
would have two positive effects: it would limit damage; and would reduce the likelihood 
of escalation by leaders who might feel obligated to respond in kind. In this respect, BMD 
was defended as a means to increase international stability. 
If deterrence ever failed, and the United States found itself under attack, however, 
advocates of BMD emphasized that the number of lives saved would, in itself, justifY the 
deployment of a missile defense. One figure offered by Secretary of Defense McNamara 
in 1968 suggested that in one war-time scenario, one hundred and twenty million 
American fatalities were possible without BMD. A BMD system operating against a 
similar attack would reduce casualties to between ten and forty million. Supporters 
concluded that: 
such a defense might change the postwar situation from one in which over 
half the U.S. population was gone, and recovery in any time period would 
be problematical, to one in which perhaps 90 percent survived and 
17 Coffey, 408. 
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economic recovery might be achieved within five to ten years. This 
difference would be enormous. 18 
While even this number of fatalities was far greater than anyone would desire, the 
statement reflects the greater acceptance of a warfighting strategy by BMD supporters. 
Another argument was founded on the life-saving principal, rather than the goal of 
strengthening deterrence. A robust missile defense system situated in defense of urban 
population centers would force the Soviets to alter their attack strategy in one of two 
ways. First, they might choose to concentrate a greater portion of their offensive forces 
on the larger cities, in an attempt to overwhelm missile defenses and ensure destruction of 
their targets. This decision would reduce the number of medium and smaller cities to face 
a nuclear attack. A second Soviet option would be to retarget offensive missiles on cities 
not covered by a missile defense system, to inflict more widespread damage. 
19 In either 
case, according to those who wished to deploy BMD, the net result would be millions of 
lives saved, even if the systems in place failed to perform effectively. Critics replied that 
"an AB:M system guarantees decreased casualties only if both sides refrain from 
simultaneously increasing their offensive capabilities. "
20 
European reaction to the Sentinel program was remarkably muted. One possible 
reason was the inability to determine the extent of Soviet missile defenses. Allies may 
have believed that the U.S. announcement was justified in response to the Soviet BMD 
development. A more plausible alternative, however, relates to The Future Tasks of the 
Alliance, a NATO report commonly referred to as the Harmel Report. This study was 
18 D. G. Brennan, "The Case For Missile Defense," Foreign Affairs 47, no. 3 (April 1969): 434. 
19 Ibid., 438. 
20 Rothstein, 499. 
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released on 1 ·1 December 1967, only months after the Sentinel announcement, and 
reaffirmed NATO's dual-track approach of defense and detente. Efforts by the Johnson 
administration to reassure the Soviets, and its insistence of the limited nature of the missile 
defense, was seemingly compatible with the Harmel Report's conclusions. 
4. Safeguard 
By 1969 the Sentinel program came under the scrutiny of President Nixon, who 
shifted the emphasis of the program. Rather than concentrate on the protection of cities 
.. 
and the U.S. population, the HMD system, now bearing the name Safeguard, would 
defend the retaliatory strike capability of the United States. The Safeguard system was 
designed to consist of 12 BMD sites, developed in a series of stages, and the first stage 
would provide a defense for two missile bases: one at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North 
Dakota, and the other at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. Follow-on stages would 
be contingent on the actions and military developments of the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic ofChina.21 
Improving relations with the Soviet Union and China in following years would cut 
short the Safeguard plan, and would dramatically alter the approach to BMD taken 
throughout the 1960s. The years between 1945 and 1972, however, were valuable to the 
country in two ways. First, the investment in the scientific community and the exponential 
improvement in U.S. missile technology assured the United States that it would remain in 
the forefront of a global missile competition. "Second, the period enabled leaders to 
consider some of the vital strategic concerns associated with the nuclear age, the spread of 
21 Baucom, 58. 
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intercontinental missile capabilities, and missile defense issues. These same issues have 
reemerged repeatedly in the years since. 
C. THE ABM TREATY: 1972-1983 
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was negotiated to establish more 
favorable conditions for additional reductions in strategic offensive weapons. The treaty 
was based on the premise that a limitation of anti-ballistic missile defenses would ensure 
the deterrent capability ofU.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. A lack of defensive measures 
would lessen the need for continuous offensive force expansion, and would maintain 
strategic effectiveness, as visualized through MAD, even in the event of substantial 
offensive reductions. Conversely, the development and deployment of effective ABM 
systems at the time might have destabilized deterrence and led to a spiraling arms race. By 
guaranteeing the vulnerability of each side, the ABM Treaty ensured that MAD remained 
intact. 
1. Treaty Provisions 
The treaty achieved this mutual vulnerability by prohibiting the deployment of a 
nationwide ABM system through a limitation on fixed site, land-based systems designed to 
counter strategic ballistic missiles in flight trajectory. Initial agreements limited each 
signatory to 100 launchers with no more than 100 interceptor missiles at two sites: an area 
containing an ICBM launch site and the nation's capital.22 Subsequently, on 3 July 1974, 
a Protocol to the Treaty was signed by both nations reducing this provision to the 
deployment of only one ABM site per nation. The Soviet Union chose to leave its 
22 Department of State, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," 1972, Article Ill. 
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Moscow defc;> e system operational, while the United States chose to maintain its ABM 
system in defe~;::;e of an ICBM silo launcher deployment area in Grand Forks, North 
Dakota. In October 1975, the Grand Forks defensive site became operational, but was 
disestablished only four months later,23 based on the cost of maintaining the system, and 
the belief that the diversity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal guaranteed that a significant portion 
would survive a first strike, without BMD, while maintaining the ability to respond.24 
A second important aspect of the ABM Treaty was the restriction on providing "a 
base for such a defense. "25 The limitation on the establishment of a base was intended to 
prevent each nation from actively pursuing a national defense ABM system capable of 
rapid deployment. Such a rapid deployment could facilitate a "breakout" from the treaty 
with severe implications for the strategic balance, and several guidelines were included to 
inhibit this potential problem. A ban was placed on deployment, development, and testing 
of space-based, sea-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems; the deployment of early 
warning radars was limited to the periphery of each nation, facing outward; and 
restrictions were placed on testing non-ABM systems "in an ABM mode" or giving non-
ABM systems "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight 
trajectory. "26 
23 Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues, 18. 
24 Sherwood Boehlert, "Sub-Committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology," NATO, 
Scientific and Technical Committee (October 1975), 4. 
25 
"Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," Article I. 
26 Jack Mendelsohn and John Rhinelander, "Shooting Down the ABM Treaty," Arms Control 
Today 24, no. 7 (September 1994): 8. 
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2. Weaknesses of the ABM Treaty 
The ABM Treaty was established to deal with the strategic ballistic missile 
scenario and was not intended to interfere with the development, testing, or deployment of 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems designed to counter a short-range ballistic missile 
threat. The exceptions mentioned, of course, prevent the testing of a TMD system in an 
ABM mode or the development of TMD capabilities that would credibly provide an 
interceptor with the ability to act against a strategic ballistic missile. One of the greatest 
criticisms of the treaty, however, rests in its failure to differentiate formally between ABM 
and TMD systems. 
This distinction was never agreed upon among Americans and Soviets, but the 
U.S. Senate and executive branch shared an informal agreement on what technical aspects 
differentiated an ABM system from a TMD system. Named after its originator, JohnS. 
Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the ''Foster Box" attempted to 
establish a standard which could be applied to delineate between ABM and TMD systems. 
The ''box" applied to the range of testing development that was to be submitted for 
defense department review for treaty compliance. Any U.S. testing of anti-missile systems 
conducted against targets traveling above an altitude of forty kilometers or traveling 
between two and four km per second would be submitted for review on an individual 
case- by- case basis. Tests conducted on targets traveling below forty kilometers or 
traveling at velocities less than two km per second were deemed to be treaty-compliant, 
while testing of systems against targets exceeding five km per second was outside of 
21 
Treaty limits, as it indicated strategic missile speeds. 27 These guidelines were unilaterally 
adhered to fo; years, but were never officially incorporated into the treaty or negotiated 
with the Soviets. 
3. European Approval 
Western European governments appeared comfortable with the 1972 ABM Treaty 
and its 1974 Protocol. The stability in East-West relations generated by the treaty was 
viewed as a strong platform to further detente. Additionally, three factors contributed to 
European approval of the ABM Treaty. First, the independent strategic nuclear arsenals 
of Great Britain and France were secured by the limits on BMD employment. Second, 
Article IX ofthe ABM Treaty prohibited the transfer of anti-ballistic missile technology to 
third countries, but allowed the continuing transfer of offensive weapons technology. 
Third, the very nature of the treaty left the United States as vulnerable to ballistic missile 
attacks as its European allies?8 Europeans viewed the ABM Treaty as a positive 
contribution to NATO security and arms control, and these sentiments remained 
consistent over the next two decades. 
The period following the signing of the ABM Treaty was one of significant decline 
in the level of resources dedicated to BMD research. The program operated within treaty 
limits, and continued to seek advances in missile guidance, optical sensors, and data 
processing technology. A number of alternative weapon systems were also studied, 
including directed energy weapons, spaced-based lasers, high-powered chemical lasers, 
27 Ibid, 9. 
28 David Yost, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance," International Security 7, no. 
2 (Fall 1982): 146. 
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and particle beams. 29 Until 1983, there were no plans to construct a deployable system, 
making President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative that much more provocative. 
D. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 1983-1990 
President Ronald Reagan arrived in Washington intent on rebuilding the military 
might of the United States and handling the Soviet Union in a very different way than the 
United States had in the previous decade. Rather than extending the conditions of 
cooperation and detente that had typified the 1970s, President Reagan viewed the Soviet 
Union as an unalterable threat to the United States and launched what could be called a 
moral crusade against the ''Evil Empire." In addition to the escalation and improvements 
to be made in the U.S. military, he challenged MAD, one of the foundations ofU.S. 
strategic policy, as a morally deficient solution to the defense of the American people and 
U.S. national security interests. Relying on the ability to avenge the death of millions of 
Americans by guaranteeing an equally devastating retaliatory strike on the Soviet Union 
was, in Reagan's eyes, an unacceptable strategy. 
1. Origins of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
On 23 March 1983, President Reagan announced a dramatic change in U.S. policy. 
Without prior discussion with the Soviets, U.S. allies, or even the U.S. defense 
bureaucracy, he declared that the United States would begin "a comprehensive and 
intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to 
achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. "30 
The United States policy would shift from deterrence to defense, and he challenged the 
29 Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues, 19. 
30 Ibid, 19. 
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U.S. scientific community to undo what it had done forty years before, and render nuclear 
weapons "impotent and obsolete."31 
Such a dramatic departure from the status quo reopened the debate on deterrence, 
mutual vulnerability, the morality of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the ABM Treaty. One 
initial outcome of the president's announcement was to effectively silence the growing 
"nuclear freeze" movement in the United States. For those advocates, criticism of a policy 
which sought to make nuclear weapons obsolete was increasingly difficult. Other issues 
were not to be as easily solved. 
Within a year, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) had been 
created by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to coordinate the consolidated missile 
defense research program as directed by the president. The SDIO was chartered to not 
develop or deploy a specific BMD system, but to "research and develop a comprehensive 
set of technologies supporting concepts ofBMD."32 The Reagan administration initially 
stressed its intention to remain fully compliant with the ABM Treaty, and by 1985 the SDI 
program had become the Pentagon's largest research and development program.33 
The SDI research program was initially developed with the protection of urban 
centers and population defense in mind. President Reagan's desire to "save lives" rather 
than "avenge them"34 was the driving moral force behind his 1983 speech. By 1985, 
31 Ronald Reagan, cited in McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, Gerard 
Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Anns Control," Foreign Affairs 63, no. 2 (April1984): 
265. 
32 Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues, 24. 
33 Boehlert, 4. 
34 William Durch, The ABM Treaty and Western Security (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 
1988), 12. 
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however, the emphasis on life-saving had diminished and was now identified only as a 
long-term goal of the program. In its place, the SDI would be designed to enhance the 
U.S. deterrent policy, whereas eliminating the nuclear missile threat was now the ultimate 
goal. To achieve this, research would proceed into the early 1990s, at which time U.S. 
leaders would have the technical foundation availabie to decide whether or not to proceed 
with the development of an actual system. The program would also provide a capability 
to develop quickly a BMD system in the event of a Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty.
35 
A 1985 Department ofDefense Report to Congress discussed how the SDI 
program would comply with the ABM Treaty. According to this report: 
the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of 
ABM components that are space-based, air-based, or mobile land-based .... 
That agreement does permit research short of field testing of a prototype 
ABM system or component. This is the type of research that will be 
conducted under the SDI program. 36 
The need to proceed beyond limits established by the treaty to advance research soon 
developed, however, and the Reagan administration attempted to apply a new, broad 
interpretation to the ABM Treaty which would enable testing to continue. 
2. The SDI Challenge to the ABM Treaty 
Part of the scheduled SDI program entailed the testing of specific hardware which 
would provide much-needed technical information. One such demonstration was 
described as an advanced boost-phase detection and tracking system. While the ABM 
Treaty clearly prohibited the development or testing of "space-based" ABM components, 
35 Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues, 25. 
36 John A Jungennan, The Strategic Defense Initiative: A Primer and Critique, (La Jolla: 
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1988}, 11. 
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the Reagan administration claimed that the detection and tracking system was not 
comprehensive enough to be identified as a component and field-testing was, therefore, 
allowable. 37 The nature of this debate over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty was one 
of the prime points of contention throughout the period of SDI research. 
Critics also argued that the development ofSDI-related technology provided the 
United States with an offensive capability that threatened to upset the strategic balance. A 
BMD system that provided the level of defense which President Reagan envisioned would 
sfgnificantly enhance the first-strike capability of the United States. Opponents argued 
that the effectiveness of an SDI system would best be realized if the opponent's retaliatory 
strength had been diminished by a U.S. first strike.38 Arguments such as these fueled the 
debate over the defensive nature of the SDI research. 
3. General European Reactions to SDI 
The Strategic Defense Initiative came as a great surprise to Europe. After the 
initial shock had worn off, and with President Reagan's election to a second term, 
Europeans realized that the SDI was a political reality, at least for the next four years. 
Between 1984 and 1986, Europe's primary concerns about the SDI spawned a great deal 
of debate, and the issues were deeply connected to the decade-old support for the ABM 
Treaty. David Yost summarizes the core European anxieties in four points: 1.) BMD 
will lead to destabilization of East-West security; 2.) arms control and detente will suffer; 
3.) alliance cohesion will diminish as U.S. security guarantees to Europe lose credibility 
37 McGeorge Bundy, et. al., 274. 
38 Jungennan, 24. 
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with the creation of a ''Fortress America"; and 4.) the stature ofthe British and French 
deterrent forces will be damaged. 39 
The fear ofEast-West destabilization was based largely on the assumption that 
abandoning mutual vulnerability and placing greater emphasis on defenses would increase 
the danger of nuclear war, and lead to a new arms race. As U.S. and Soviet efforts to 
improve BMD capabilities developed, it was argued that the defensive arms race would 
lead to fears of a preemptive strike by the other side, and increase the likelihood of an 
accidental launch. The defensive arms race would, in turn, lead to an increase in offensive 
capabilities as both sides attempted to overwhelm the opponent by increasing the number 
of missiles, decoys, and penetration aids. 40 The end result of this would be increased 
tension between the superpowers, with Europe caught in the middle. 
European supporters of the ABM Treaty believed that Reagan's proposal placed in 
jeopardy the agreement between the two superpowers. For many, the ABM Treaty was 
the cornerstone ofU.S. arms control initiatives (such as SALT I and SALT II), and if 
President Reagan's SDI damaged the credibility of the treaty then arms control efforts 
would suffer as well. It was also feared that the SDI's dramatic change of course might 
threaten the peaceful coexistence which had marked the better part of the 1970s. For 
Europeans, America's Strategic Defense Initiative was an alternative approach with little 
appeal. 
39 Yost, "European Anxieties about Ballistic Missile Defense," Washington Quarterly 7, no. 4 
(Falll984): 117. 
40 Ibid, 117. 
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Perhaps the most critical European concern about U.S. BMD research in the 1980s 
was the impact it would have on U.S. security guarantees to Europe. A worst-case 
scenario envisioned the United States withdrawing from European affairs, safe under a 
missile-proofBMD shield. Less threatening than a ''Fortress America" was the possibility 
of a United States more willing to escalate East-West conflict to the nuclear level, if faced 
with Soviet aggression, with the knowledge that U.S. territory could be defended against 
Soviet missiles. For European NATO members, who for obvious reasons would prefer to 
k:eep regional conflict on the conventional level, the loss of commitment by the United 
States would be devastating. The fear of decoupling was heightened by the exorbitant 
estimated cost of SDI research, and the negative impact it would have on U.S. 
conventional forces in Europe. 41 Europeans who lauded the ABM Treaty for securing 
equal vulnerability for all members of the Atlantic Alliance saw the Strategic Defense 
Initiative as an American attempt to alter that situation. 
The effect of the SDI on Europe's independent nuclear arsenals is examined more 
closely below in chapters III and IV, but any degradation of their effectiveness or 
credibility would affect all NATO members. Improved Soviet BMD in response to U.S. 
development would force Great Britain and France to spend more to guarantee the 
effectiveness of their arsenals. Defense budgets would need to be reconsidered, and 
Alliance partners were concerned that conventional support would suffer. Again, an 
41 Trevor Taylor, "Europe and the SDI," Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 130, 
no. 1 (March 1985): 42. 
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unfavorable balance of conventional NATO forces would increase the probability of 
nuclear weapons use in the event of Soviet or Warsaw Pact aggression. 42 
The technical feasibility of developing an effective missile defense was challenged 
throughout the lifetime of the SDI program. Many found the goal of making nuclear 
weapons "obsolete" to be sheer fantasy, and were convinced that the United States would 
never be willing to move in that direction, while relying solely on a defensive shield to 
prevent missile attacks. Nevertheless, President Reagan's approach to BMD represented 
a significant challenge to the status quo. The broad scope of his program, and the 
questions it raised about the ABM Treaty demonstrated the enduring debate about 
strategic defense, a debate which would not be solved even with the end of the Cold War. 
E. POST-COLD WAR U.S. BMD EFFORTS: 1990 TO THE PRESENT 
1. President Bush and GPALS 
Upon his arrival in office in 1989, President Bush initiated a complete National 
Security Review. One portion of that review consisted of an independent examination of 
the SDI program, and upon completion in 1990 the shape of the U.S. BMD program 
began to change once again. The review endorsed the ''Brilliant Pebbles" space-based 
interceptor as a replacement for previous systems. While the old system was comprised of 
a collection of interceptors stored collectively in one large carrier vehicle, the ''Brilliant 
Pebbles" concept was to develop a: 
constellation of thousands of individual interceptors, each with its own 
surveillance capability and enough computing power to operate 
autonomously, if necessary, within its field ofvision.43 
42 Yost, "European Anxieties about Ballistic Missile Defense," 126. 
43 Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues, 28. 
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The review recommended that the new type of interceptor should be deployed during 
SDI's initial phase. 
By January 1991, however, the scope ofSDI had diminished. During his State of 
the Union message, President Bush outlined his new vision ofBMD. Rather than 
defending against a full-scale Soviet missile strike as President Reagan had envisioned with 
SDI, Bush emphasized a U.S. defense against limited attacks, from a variety of sources. 
Of specific concern was the growing awareness of the proliferation ofWMD and ballistic 
niissile technology in the Third World, and secondarily, the accidental or unauthorized 
launch of Russian or Chinese missiles.44 Saddam Hussein's use of Scud missiles during 
the GulfWar and the instability which accompanied the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
each demonstrated the viability of this new focus. 
The newly designed Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GP ALS) had three 
objectives: protection of U.S. territory, defense of deployed U.S. forces, and the 
protection of allied nations. To accomplish this, the system would be comprised of three 
components to be implemented incrementally. First, land-based systems would be 
deployed to meet a theater ballistic missile threat, primarily to support U.S. and allied 
forces, as well as overseas allies. Second, the threat to the United States would be met 
with interceptors deployed on U.S. territory, with early warning provided by space-based 
sensors. Third, the "Brilliant Pebbles" program would deploy space-based.interceptors to 
address both strategic and theater missiles. 45 While emphasizing the more limited goals, 
44 Charles L. Glaser, "Nuclear Policy Without an Adversary," International Security 16, no. 4 
(Spring 1992): 62. 
45 Ibid 
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however, President Bush did not rule out the possibility of increasing the scope of the U.S. 
BMD program to meet broader objectives. 
In response to this initiative, Congress passed the 1991 Missile Defense Act to 
provide funding for the program. Congress also urged the President to begin discussions 
with the Russians to reexamine the possibility of modifying the ABM Treaty. The goal of 
these discussions was to increase ''flexibility for technology development of advanced 
ballistic missile defenses" and to clarify the distinction between TMD and strategic 
defenses. 46 
2. President Clinton and a Redefined BMD Strategy 
The election ofPresident Clinton in 1992led to a dramatic departure from the 
direction in which missile defense programs had been proceeding in the previous two 
administrations. Although the Reagan and Bush administrations embraced the broad 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty, President Clinton adhered to the more narrow, or 
restrictive, interpretation. While recognizing the need for TMD to protect forward-
deployed troops, airfields, and bases, the administration emphasized the importance of the 
ABM Treaty as the ''bedrock of strategic stability" and the "cornerstone" ofU.S.-Russian 
relations. 47 GP ALS was eliminated as an administration objective, arid a more fiscally 
restrained TMD program was implemented. 
President Clinton's adherence to the ABM Treaty, coupled with his desire to 
provide the military with effective TMD, led the administration, in November 1993, to 
46 Guy Roberts, "An Elegant Irrelevance: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the New World 
Disorder," Strategic Review, 23, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 25. 
47 Robert Joseph and Keith Payne, "Ballistic Missile Defense: The Need for a National Debate," 
Strategic Forum no. 37 (July 1995), 1. 
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submit a proposal to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in Geneva. The SCC, 
as established in Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, was designed to, among other things, 
"consider questions concerned with the obligations assumed and related situations which 
may be considered ambiguous," and "consider ... proposals for amendments in accordance 
with the provisions of this treaty." President Clinton's proposal was intended to clarify 
the distinction between TMD and strategic defenses to permit development, testing, and 
deployment of TMD systems, while remaining within the legal boundaries of the treaty; 
tliis proposal was similar in some respects to the one mandated in the 1991 Missile 
Defense Act. 
3. ABM Treaty Negotiations 
Specifically, the President's proposal recommended that the demarcation line be 
established as follows: missile interceptors developed and tested to engage missiles with a 
range of3,500 km or less, or missiles traveling less than 5 Ian per second would be 
determined to be TMD. Any testing conducted on missiles above the 3,500 km range or 
above 5 Ian per second would be deemed an ABM system, and therefore, a violation of 
the ABM Treaty. The justification ofthe administration for the demarcation at 5 Ian per 
second was the need to effectively counter medium range missiles such as the Chinese 
CSS-2, which has a 3,000 km range and a 5 Ian per second reentry velocity.48 These 
figures fall short of the vast majority of strategic ICBMs today, which possess a 10,000 
Ian range and a reentry speed of 7 km per second. 
48 Lisbeth Gronlund, George Lewis, Theodore Postol, and David Wright, "Highly Capable 
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The immediate reaction by arms control advocates and treaty supporters was 
outrage at a Clinton proposal which they believed would destroy the intended purpose of 
the ABM Treaty, even while working to remain legally within its boundaries. The primary 
argument against the demarcation line is that it would allow the development and 
deployment of any number ofBl\ID systems, by both sides, provided that they were never 
tested above 5 km per second. That is not to say that the systems would be incapable of 
effectively operating above the demarcation line, only that the ability to do so had never 
been demonstrated. 
The core intention of the treaty, as discussed earlier, was to limit the development 
and deployment of systems in a NMD capacity with the capability to counteract a strategic 
missile. The limit remains at one site with one hundred launchers and missiles, as amended 
by the 1974 Treaty Protocol. Secondarily, therisk of"breakout" by either side through 
rapid deployment oflarge numbers of defensive systems is reduced through the prohibition 
on developing a base for an extensive deployment ofNMD. Arms control advocates 
suggested that, in both cases, the Clinton proposal would violate the treaty's intent. A 
system that was designed to handle confidently a threat against a missile traveling at 5 km 
per second might have a significant capability against a target traveling at 7 km per 
second. In fact, the Russian strategic inventory still contains a number of SS-18 SLBMs, 
with an estimated reentry velocity of 6. 5 km per second, leaving a margin of 1. 5 km per 
second as the only limitation between demonstrated and actual strategic capabilities. 
49 
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Such a shift in treaty interpretation would have been a dramatic departure from the 
previous standards established and voluntarily followed with the ''Foster Box." 
Had the Russians accepted this proposal as it was presented, the result would have 
enabled the deployment of systems with potential strategic capabilities, under the name of 
TMD. Furthermore, it would have legitimized the future development and deployment of 
more technologically advanced systems with far greater capabilities against strategic 
targets, provided they were never tested against missiles with speeds greater than 5 km per 
second. Debate raged over whether this would constitute a ''base" for a NMD system, 
and the Clinton administration argued that the testing was the crucial factor in the 
distinction between ABM and TMD. As Robert Bell, Special Director for Defense Policy 
and Arms Control, at the National Security Council said: 
The theory here was quite simple. No rational military organization is 
going to deploy as an ABM defense, at the cost of billions of dollars, a 
system that has not been tested to show that it can be an ABM. 50 
While the logic of this statement is reasonable, the argument remained that the intent of 
the treaty was still being violated. In any case, a few months later, Russian negotiators 
accepted the proposal, but only under certain additional conditions. 
The Russian counter-proposal at the SCC sought to limit the velocity of the 
interceptor, as well, to 3 km per second, indicating that an interceptor with a higher 
capability would be classified as an ABM. The Russian position was interesting, in that it 
allowed the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program, the highest 
priority of the administration's entire BMD plan, to proceed with its development and 
50 Robert Bell, "Ballistic Missile Defense: An Administrative Perspective," Strategic Forum no. 
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testing. THAAD's design gives it the ability to counter medium-range missiles, such as 
the Chinese CSS-2, and reaches a maximum intercept velocity of2.7 km per second. 5
1 It 
was with THAAD in mind that the Clinton administration's initial proposal had been 
devised. 
The Russian plan was initially rejected, but then became the source of a heated 
controversy. While the State Department and Anns Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) recommended approval, and the Anny backed the limits suggested, congressional 
objections mounted, with Navy and Air Force support. Critics of the Russian proposal 
were unwilling to trade an agreement which allowed THAAD testing for the future 
development of more advanced TMD systems. Both Air Force and Navy systems with 
faster intercept velocities were already in conceptual stages, and opposition to the 
cancellation of these programs was tremendous. 
In June 1994 the administration offered yet another compromise proposal to the 
Russians. Limits on mobile ground-based systems would be capped at a 3 km per second 
interceptor speed, but air -based and sea-based TMD systems would not be covered by the 
same restrictions. Instead, a more permissive guideline would be worked out with higher 
interceptor velocity limits. 52 In effect, the administration was attempting to make future 
Navy and Air Force TMD systems treaty-compliant in an attempt to satisfy the services 
and Congress, while continuing to negotiate with the Russians. 
51 Richard Falkenrath, "Theatre Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty," Survival 36, no. 4 
(Winter 1994-95): 146. 
52 Ibid, 146. 
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4. Congressional Opposition 
Congressional distaste for the negotiations began to increase, and by January of 
1995 the SCC talks had failed to "clarify" the demarcation line between TMD and ABM 
systems. In an effort to comply with the increasing pressure of the Republican Congress, 
President Clinton announced that the THAAD system was, in fact, a treaty-compliant 
TMD system, and that testing would begin as soon as possible. At the same time, 
however, he continued to push for U.S.-Russian concurrence on treaty modifications 
through the sec, which had failed to achieve anything in well over a year of negotiations. 
Throughout February and March 1995, efforts by Republican senators and 
representatives became more pronounced, and Congress began to take a much more active 
role in the BMD issue. Their opposition to the administration's negotiations was 
demonstrated in a letter sent by Republican leaders to the President. On March 8, 1995, 
this letter, which originated in Senator Dole's office, questioned the "continued relevance 
of the ABM Treaty," and indicated that "the cornerstone of U.S. security policy should 
not be a Cold War era treaty .... " Moreover, the letter reaffirmed the Senate's stance that 
self-imposed limitations should not be "codified" since TMD is not limited at all by the 
ABM Treaty. 53 The limitations being negotiated, according to the senators, placed severe 
restrictions on the ability to provide the best possible defense for American soldiers. 
53 
"Documentation," Comparative Strategy 14, no. 3 (July-September 1995): 322. 
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This interpretation had been expressed legislatively in a bill (H.R. 7) introduced in 
January 1995. In Sec. 202, the Sense of Congress on TJ\.ID and the ABM Treaty was 
described as follows: 
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was not intended to, and does not, 
apply to or limit research, development, testing, or deployment of missile 
defense systems, system upgrades, or system components that are designed 
to counter modem theater ballistic missiles, regardless of the capabilities of 
such missiles, unless those systems, system upgrades, or system components 
are tested against or have demonstrated capabilities to counter modem 
strategic ballistic missiles. 54 
This interpretation is vastly different than any previous one. Article VI of the treaty 
prohibits giving TJ\.ID missile systems "capabilities" to counter strategic missiles and 
testing them "in an ABM mode." The declaration in HR. 7 emphasizes the testing 
criteria, while eliminating the "capabilities" clause. 
Further resistance to the Clinton administration's policies by Senate Republicans 
was presented legislatively with the introduction of the bill (S. 383) on 10 February 1995, 
which was intended to establish policy on the deployment of ABM and TJ\.ID systems. If 
passed, the bill would have required that both TJ\.ID and ABM systems be deployed at the 
earliest possible date to defend elements of the Armed Forces and the territory of the 
United States. No reference to the ABM Treaty or limitations on ABM system is 
mentioned. An amendment in April1995, entitled the Theater Missile Defense Act of 
1995, did, however, clarify the Senate position on a TJ\.ID/ABM demarcation line: the 
system would be classified TJ\.ID if it was not tested against a target with a range of3,500 
km or more, or a velocity of 5 km per second or more. 55 This return to the 
54 Ibid, 328. 
55 Ibid., 324. 
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administration's initial proposal ofNovember 1993 again suggested the Republicans' 
refusal to sacrifice development of technologically advanced systems, and their 
disapproval ofPresident Clinton's position on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. 
Still resisting this pressure, President Clinton continued in his effort to reach an 
understanding on the interpretation of the treaty. On 10 May 1995, he and President 
Y eltsin issued a joint statement on the missile threat as a basis for further discussion on an 
eventual solution to the demarcation line disagreement. The statement suggested that 1.) 
tMo deployments should not pose a threat to strategic opposition, 2.) they should not be 
tested against strategic systems, and 3.) the scale of deployment, in number and 
geographic scope, should be consistent with identified threats. 56 While non-binding and 
largely symbolic, the statement signified the administration's continued adherence to the 
principles behind the treaty. Negotiations would continue. 
U.S. negotiators presented a new proposal on 22 June 1995, which made 
significant concessions to Russian concerns. First, the proposal recommended the 
definition of a TMD system as an interceptor with a velocity of 3 km or less operating 
against a target with a range of3,500 km or less, or traveling 5 km per second or less. 
Second, interceptors traveling above 3 km would be subject to review by the other side. 
Finally, a series of confidence-building measures, including observers at TMD test sites, 
would be developed. Nonetheless, the Russians rejected this latest proposal, and 
protested that the THAAD testing already underway was a direct violation of the ABM 
Treaty. 
56 Joint Statement of President Clinton and President Yeltsin on 10 May 1995. 
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Senate reaction to this latest proposal was even more intense, as demonstrated in 
June's FY 96 defense authorization bill. The bill called for a multi-site NMD deployment 
by 2003, and a TMD deployment at the earliest possible date. Additionally, it called for a 
review of the "continuing value and validity" of the ABM Treaty, and the prohibition of 
further attempts by the administration to place limits on B:MD systems or to continue 
negotiations in the SCC. 57 Heated opposition by Senate Democrats and the 
Administration led to compromise language which modified the NMD plan to be 
"developed for deployment" by 2003, and sanctioned negotiations in the sec to legally 
deploy this system. This new version was reviewed in September. 
By November 1995, a draft framework on a demarcation between ABM and TMD 
systems was prepared, in response to May's joint statement. The previous U.S. proposal 
of a 3,500 km range and 5 km per second target, with interceptor speed less than 3 km per 
second was incorporated into this framework, along with a series of confidence-building 
measures designed to provide continuing security guarantees to both sides that strategic 
arsenals remained unthreatened. To date, the SCC has been unable to achieve consensus 
on this framework, and after thirty-one months, the demarcation question remains 
unsettled. 58 
The negative attitudes toward B:MD have, for the most part, disappeared in 
Europe, and for the Europeans the demarcation talks are of tremendous interest. 
Europeans favor Clinton's support for the ABM Treaty, but the outcome of the 
57 Jack Mendelsohn, "ABM Treaty Remains Threatened By Continuing U.S. Push for TMD," 
Arms Control Today 25, no. 7 (September 1995): 33. 
58 Jim Mannion, "Russia Balks at Partial ABM Pact," Agence France Presse, 31 October 1996. 
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demarcation talks could potentially have a greater impact on their defense than that of the 
United States. Theater systems offer national coverage capabilities for Europe, and 
possibly coverage for the entire continent. The outcome of the talks in Geneva could 
reduce or enhance the options available to those governments considering BMD 
deployment. Negotiations could result in the determination that certain systems are 
constrained by the ABM Treaty, and therefore unavailable for technology transfer. 
Concern exists that U.S. political motivations might result in concessions that inhibit the 
defensive options of NATO partners. 59 
Most recently, the conflict between the Republican Senate and the Clinton 
administration, and their severe ideological differences, has become even more evident. 
On 6 February, 1996, Senator Helms introduced the Strategic Anti-Missile Revitalization 
and Security Act of 1996 (S. R. 1562) which, if passed, would require the complete 
withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty. Citing both the future threat of 
missile attack from rogue nations, as well as the existent arsenals of Russia and China, 
Senator Helms indicated that the ABM Treaty had outlived its usefulness and that it was 
now only an obstacle to the necessary defense of the territory and citizens of the United 
States. 60 While this bill is extreme in nature, it typifies the attitude of the staunch 
defenders ofBMD development, who see the ABM Treaty as an impediment to the 
security of the nation. In their view, the strategic relevance of the treaty has been 
overshadowed by the newly developing threat of Third World missile proliferation. 
59 Correspondence with Jo Vaughan, Bradford University, 15 November 1996. 60 U.S. Congress, Senate, Strategic Anti-Missile Revitalization and Security Act of 1996, 104th 
Cong., S. R 1562, Congressional Record (6 February 1996), S 917-919. 
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5. The New Direction of BMD Research 
On 16 February 1996, Secretary ofDefense William Perry outlined the direction in 
which the Department of Defense's Ballistic Missile Defense program is proceeding. 
Emphasis has been placed on the development of systems to meet short to medium range 
threats, taking advantage of systems currently in the BMD infrastructure, while THAAD 
funding for the next six years has been cut by approximately thirty five percent. NMD 
research has been modified to a "deployment readiness" approach which will conduct 
three years ofNMD system development, in compliance with the ABM Treaty, without 
making a decision to deploy. If, after the three years, a decision to deploy is made, then it 
would be ready in an additional three years.61 
This readjustment of the BMD program is consistent with administration policy. 
Placing emphasis on short and medium range systems underlines President Clinton's 
attempt to maintain positive strategic relations with the Russians and ensure U.S. efforts 
to remain treaty-compliant. However, this approach has been unsatisfactory both to arms 
control advocates, who see his program as proceeding beyond the limits of the treaty, and 
to those who believe his restrictions have reduced the ability of the United States to 
defend itself 
6. Strategic Considerations 
As American policy makers continue to debate the future ofBMD, concern for the 
defense of troops, allies, and U.S. territory continues to supersede discussion of the 
strategic implications of abandoning or modifying the ABM Treaty. In an attempt to 
1996. 
61 Secretary of Defense William Perry Ballistic Missile Defense Program Briefing, 16 February 
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address tt' emerging North-South security threat, concern over East-West security has 
dwindled, even though ''Russian strategic forces continue to have the ability to destroy 
American society.',62 There are still certain strategic factors to be considered, however, 
before rejecting this twenty-four year old international agreement. 
Advocates of the ABM Treaty argue that it has been extremely effective in 
achieving its intended purpose. By ensuring the security of strategic offensive missiles 
through the limitation of defenses, it created an environment in which the arms race was 
siowed, and negotiations of START I and START IT reductions were successfully 
concluded. Today, with the Duma ratification of the START IT Treaty in peril, further 
tension over the ABM Treaty can only increase the likelihood that it will not be ratified. 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin indicated in October 1995 that: 
The START II ratification process will undoubtedly be influenced by the 
state of affairs concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We proceed 
from the need to keep the Treaty intact and strictly observe it, for cuts in 
strategic offensive arms are impossible to effect without that. 63 
Critics disagree that START IT ratification should be linked to the treaty; but if the ABM 
Treaty was an important aspect in the reduction negotiations, then its removal or 
· alteration must be considered during the ratification process as well. 
Likewise, while further reductions in strategic missiles may not seem likely at this 
point in time, the future of Russia is extremely uncertain. To disrupt the current 
environment by departing from the ABM Treaty would virtually ensure that any future 
62 John Pike, cited at the Arms Control Association News Conference held on December 8, 1993. 
Arms Control Today 24, no. 1 (January/February 1994): 13. 
63 Nikolay Setunskiy, "Chemomyrdin Interviewed By Canadian Newspaper," !tar-Tass, FBIS-
SOV-95-190, October 1, 1995. 
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arms reductions would be impossible. A pennanent freeze in arms reductions between the 
United States and Russia also would have a negative impact on the international 
nonproliferation regime. The United States would convey a mixed message: while 
striving to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states, the United States would 
appear to be acting to maintain its enonnous nuclear arsenal. 
Supporters of an aggressive NMD and TMD deployment plan make very few 
remarks regarding the Russian ability to develop similar systems. They point to "Russia's 
massive nuclear threat':>64 as justification for U.S. defensive build-up, and also suggest that 
'Under their current economic circumstances the Russians are ill-equipped to compete 
with the United States in developing sophisticated, technologically advanced ballistic 
missile defenses.':>65 Looking beyond ·today's economic circumstances, however, both 
administration efforts and congressional legislation provide authority to both sides to 
deploy or sell TMD systems, which possess theoretical strategic capabilities. Considering 
current Russian sales of ballistic missiles for civilian space programs, the possibility of 
Russian sales of TMD technology for much.:. needed hard currency is not implausible. 
Even though Russian deployment ofTMD systems on a limited scale would have a 
minimum effect on the U.S. strategic forces, the reliability ofBritish and French arsenals 
could be put into jeopardy. By depriving Britain and France of their independent 
deterrents, the European security environment could face a period of destabilization and 
uncertainty. These concerns are addressed in greater detail in Chapters Ill and IV. China, 
64 U.S. Congress, Senate, Strategic Anti-Missile Revitalization Act of 1996. 
65 Roberts, 21. 
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as well, would be affected, as its limited strategic deterrent is comprised primarily of the 
medium range CSS-2.66 
One of the primary arguments of those pushing hardest for the deployment of 
missile defenses is that the size of the NMD currently envisaged would be insignificant 
against a Russian strategic attack of thousands ofiCBMs. The NMD is being designed to 
handle a limited number of incoming missiles from rogue nations or the accidental or 
unauthorized launch from Russia, and should not, therefore, be of any concern to Russian 
leaders. The logic behind this may be relatively sound, but it fails to consider the Russian 
perspective. As the Russian armed forces continue to crumble, as seen in the Chechnya 
conflict, the security of Russian territory is being provided primarily through its nuclear 
deterrent. As the only remaining show of force, Russian planners are believed to be 
relying heavily on that arsenal, and any threat to their strategic capability is a grave 
concern. 
The instability that currently exists in Russia does not mean that it should be 
ignored as a potential threat. Strategic considerations must have as great a role in 
decisions concerning the ABM Treaty as potential adversaries in other parts of the world. 
It would be wise to consider that ''the menace from the South is not so pressing, or the 
potential threat from the East so remote, that institutions that have served so well for so 
long should be lightly discarded. '>67 
66 Spurgeon Keeney, Jr., "The Theater Missile Defense Threat to U.S. Security," Anns Control 
Today 24, no. 7 (September 1994): 6. 
67 John Pike and Marcus Corbin, "Taking Aim at the ABM Treaty: THAAD and U.S. Security," 
Anns Control Today 25, no. 4 (May 1995): 4. 
44 
F. SUMMARY 
After nearly forty years of debate, the military and political utility of ballistic 
missile defense remains difficult to determine. Technological advances and the end of the 
Cold War have done little to alter the fundamental questions. The present U.S. BMD 
debate and the 1967 debate surrounding deployment of the Sentinel BMD system, for 
example, have a remarkable number of similarities. Thirty years ago, the threat was an 
unknown, emerging Chinese adversary which might or might not be deterred by the U.S. 
policy of mutual deterrence. Today, fears of a burgeoning Third World threat rise from 
similar concerns. In both cases, BMD advocates insist that deployment would not be 
directed against and would not affect the Soviet (now Russian) offensive capability. 
Critics claim that deployment would adversely affect arms control efforts, and lead to 
increased tension between East and West, regardless of its intended focus. 
It may be true that the advances in BMD technology would allow a defense of the 
United States against a missile attack by a rogue state, or an accidental or unauthorized 
launch by China or Russia. It is also true, however, that establishing such a defense might 
have more far-reaching effects than intended, including effects on the security concerns of 
our allies. To assess the benefits and consequences ofBMD for U.S. and Alliance security 
remains the primary challenge to U.S. policy makers, as they work to provide the best 
possible defense for the United States. 
45 
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ID. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND GREAT BRITAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Great Britain has long been the closest ally of the United States. Maintaining 
positive relations with Great Britain should be one of the highest priorities of the U.S. 
government, yet security issues in Washington often cause friction with Britain. Missile 
defense has been such an issue and has at times resulted in strained relations between the 
governments. The utility ofBMD has been debated in the United States since the 1960s, 
but it became a serious issue for Great Britain only following President Reagan's SDI 
speech in 1983. Prior to that, the Sentinel program generated little discussion, and the 
U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty and MAD received British support throughout the 
1970s. 
Assessing the implications of the SDI for British security interests took British 
officials considerable time and involved four long-term issues. While concern about 
Britain's independent nuclear arsenal surfaced early, political, economic, and technological 
considerations clouded the ability of the government to formulate a clear policy on the 
U.S. program. Additionally, concern over Alliance cohesion, conventional force posture, 
arms control, and relations with the Soviet Union and Europe only added to the sense of 
confusion. The British government was caught between a desire to enhance the 
transatlantic "special relationship" while promoting its own strategic and political goals. 
The resulting British policy regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative was ambiguous, 
hedged by criticism and skepticism, and offered only qualified support. Such limited 
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support was indicative of the tension between the two governments generated by the 
missile defense issue. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the British government has revised its opinion on 
BMD and has acknowledged the need to consider missile defense as a way to stop 
aggressive "rogue states." Support for NATO missile defenses and systems designed to 
protect deployed troops is evident in the dialogue of British policy makers. The post-Cold 
War actions of the government, however, suggest that Great Britain and the United States 
still have vastly different opinions on the utility of missile defense. Faced with a shrinking 
defense budget, the British government has been unable to determine the role of its 
strategic nuclear deterrent force in the post-Cold War environment. Still firm in its belief 
that deterring missile threats requires political and diplomatic action, the British 
government has demonstrated an inconsistency between words and actions, and has been 
unable to define clearly a policy on BMD. As a result, the United States and Great Britain 
will continue to have difficulties defining common strategies and security goals. Until 
common policies on BMD can be developed, the "special relationship" between the two 
countries will suffer along with the cohesion necessary to sustain NATO's collective 
defense requirements. 
B. BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATiVE 
Little public debate emerged in the year following President Reagan's speech. 
While the implications were being processed, the government developed a ''wait and see" 
attitude to determine the extent of the U.S. initiative and observe how much U.S. policy 
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actually shifted. Also, there was little sense of urgency due to the extremely lo
ng 
timeframe for actual SDI deployment. If it were ever to reach the deployment stage
--and 
many experts doubted the technology could ever be developed--it would be at
 least 15-20 
years before BMD systems would be deployed to protect key military installat
ions and 
ICBM silos. A more thorough defense, to include population centers, would n
ot be 
achievable for a minimum of20-30 years.
68 
1. Early British Reactions 
The reelection of Ronald Reagan forced the government to acknowledge that U
.S. 
political and financial commitment to the SDI would be present for at least ano
ther four 
years, and that a more formal British policy would be required. The first publi
c reference 
to the U.S. BMD program emerged in July 1984, in a speech given by Prime Minis
ter 
Margaret Thatcher, as she suggested some of the reservations held by the Briti
sh 
government. While emphasizing the strength of the British-American relation
ship, the 
prime minister stated the need to "address ourselves to the new and urgent cha
llenge of 
arms control in outer space. Otherwise we may see our own peaceful use of s
pace 
endangered. We may see space turned into a new and terrible theatre ofwar.',6
9 The 
prime minister's concerns about an arms race expanded to the depths of space,
 however, 
were balanced by an understanding that direct opposition to the Reagan propo
sal would 
be impossible. Such a stance would put the British in the unenviable position o
f arguing 
68 Paul Stares, "The Implications ofBMD for Britain's Nuclear Deterrent," in H
ans Brauch, ed., 
Star Wars and European Defence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 333. 
69 Margaret Thatcher, cited in Ivo Daalder, The SDI Challenge to Europe (Cambridge: Ballinger 
Publishing, 1987), 12-13. 
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against a U.S. right to defend its citizens, and would align Great Britain with the Soviets, 
who sought to end U.S. SDI plans. 
In November 1984, internal assessments of the implications of the SDI were 
conducted by the Ministry ofDefence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. From 
these studies, the government provided Prime Minister Thatcher a list of issues which 
included the difficulty of maintaining U.S.-Soviet stability in a B:MD-enhanced 
environment, the impact the program would have on developing strategic doctrine within 
NATO, fear that U.S. commitment to the SDI would come at the cost of conventional 
military commitment to European defense, and apprehension that arms control efforts 
would suffer almost immediately. 70 With these security issues in mind, Prime Minister 
Thatcher arrived in Washington to discuss British commitment to the SDI with President 
Reagan. 
2. The Camp David Meeting 
The 22 December 1984 meeting at Camp David, produced four points agreed to 
by both leaders as the underlying conditions of future SDI research and development. As 
the prime minister later reported to the House of Commons, they were: 
1. the United States (and Western) aim is not to achieve superiority, but to 
maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments 
2. SDI-related developments would, in view of treaty obligations, have to 
be a matter of negotiation 
3. the overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence 
4. East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced 
levels of offensive systems on both sides. 71 
70 Stares, 333. 
71 Daalder, 13. 
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Providing that these conditions were adhered to, Prime Minister Thatcher was willing to 
express qualified support for the U.S. SDI research program, demonstrating the 
continuing bond between the two nations. 
The first point reiterates the British view that technology alone cannot determine 
strategic Western security and that political dialogue between East and West is an 
essential condition for continued stability. The British maintained that consideration of the 
perceptions and responses of the Soviet Union was crucial throughout each developmental 
stage of the SDI research program. Brash action by the United States could instigate the 
Soviet Union to expand or accelerate its own BMD research and development. Such an 
outcome could ultimately have an impact on Britain's independent arsenal. 
The implicit reference to the ABM Treaty in the second point emphasizes the 
strong British support for the 1972 agreement. Cited by British officials as ''the legal 
foundation for our present structure of deterrence, on which rest our hopes for peace,"
72 
and "a real achievement in an agreed approach to ensuring a stable and peaceful world,"
73 
obtaining a U.S. commitment to adhere to the twelve-year-old treaty was deemed an 
essential condition to any British support for the SDI. The ABM Treaty had guaranteed 
the viability ofBritain's limited strategic arsenal and any SDI deployment decision would 
seriously jeopardize the continued existence of the treaty. 
Enhancing deterrence, rather than replacing it as outlined in the third point, 
represented a shift in U.S. rhetoric away from past statements which emphasized the goal 
72 Margaret Thatcher, cited in David Yost, "Western Europe and the U.S. Strategic Defense 
Initiative," Journal of International Affairs 41, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 296. 
73 British Defense Minister George Younger, cited in Yost, "Western Europe ... ", 296. 
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of eliminating the deterrent situation of Mutually Assured Destruction. While 
interpretation of the point left open the question of whether deterrence had to involve 
nuclear weapons, British opinion was firmly rooted in the belief that eliminating the 
nuclear deterrent policy was both unrealistic and unwanted for three primary reasons. 
First, the general consensus of British scientists and policy makers was that the creation of 
a "perfect" shield which could destroy all incoming ballistic missiles without a shadow of a 
doubt was an unrealistic assumption. Reliance on such a system would be uncertain, as 
there could be no way to test its capabilities to guarantee success if it were actually 
needed. Second, development of offensive weapons by both the United States and the 
Soviet Union would have to continue to prevent a breakthrough by either side in offensive 
technology using other delivery systems or improved ballistic missile capability. Third, 
British concern for the conventional military balance in Europe stressed the need for 
nuclear deterrence to counter a Warsaw Pact conventional superiority which could never 
be matched by NATO forces. An end to nuclear deterrence, created by impermeable 
shields over the superpowers, would make Europe "safe for conventional war."74 
The fourth point agreed to by Thatcher and Reagan reiterated British support for 
arms control measures as the best possible means to ease tensions and enhance security. 
Linked to the reliance on political dialogue and to Thatcher's July 1984 statement, it 
appears that the British plan to avoid an arms race in space amounted to arms control 
74 Trevor Taylor, "Britain's Response to the Strategic Defense Initiative," International Affairs 
62, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 220-221. 
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efforts, which would include negotiating away SDI in conjunction with large-scale 
reductions in offensive weapons. 
75 
The Reagan administration's acceptance of the four points was questionable from 
the start. Nothing agreed to in December 1984 represented a formal commitment by the 
United States. While not legally binding in any way, the agreement attempted to establish 
a framework under which British support for, and participation in, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative could be established. The agreement contained a number of ambiguities which 
left it open for interpretation by each side, yet it was these ambiguities that made it 
possible to reach any agreement at all. The U.S. government touted the Reagan-Thatcher 
agreement as representing the solid backing by its closest ally, while in reality it had 
merely established Britain's qualified support for the research phase of the U.S. BMD 
program. 
3. The Transition From Skepticism to Commitment 
Perhaps to emphasize the limited nature of British support, the next formal 
statement of British policy came in Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe's speech at the 
Royal United Services Institute on 15 March 1985. Largely a reiteration of the four points 
agreed upon at Camp David, the Howe speech raised a number of questions concerning 
the cost of'SDI, its impact on U.S. commitment to the defense ofEurope, the 
development of alternative offensive weapons it might provoke, and its impact on Soviet 
perceptions. 76 Howe warned that ''there would be no advantage in creating a new 
Maginot Line of the 21st century, liable to be outflanked by relatively simpler and 
75 Taylor, "Britain's Response to the Strategic Defence Initiative," 220. 
76 Taylor, "The British Response," in Hans Brauch, Star Wars and European Defence, 133. 
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demonstrably cheaper countermeasures."77 Even more descriptive of British governmental 
opinion, Howe stated that: 
deterrence has worked; and it will continue to work. It may be enhanced by 
active defences. Or their development may set us on a road that diminishes 
security .... Unfortunately we have to face the harsh realities of a world in 
which nuclear weapons exist and cannot be disinvented. 78 
The Howe speech became one of the primary British policy statements on the Strategic 
Defense Initiative and demonstrated the less than enthusiastic support the British gave it. 
Although U.S. officials were outraged by Howe's comments, the speech was the 
last critical statement to emerge from the British government. There were two factors 
which quelled British public skepticism. First, the debate quickly shifted away from 
strategic and political issues to a determination of the extent ofBritain's involvement. 
Ongoing criticism was hardly appropriate for a partner desiring inclusion in research 
contracts. Second, further criticism was deemed inappropriate, providing the research 
program continued to abide by the conditions of the four points outlined above. 
79 By 
summer of 1985, economic considerations began to play a more significant role in British 
policy towards the SDI. 
4. British Participation 
A number of factors influenced the participation considerations of the British 
government. First, the commitment by the Reagan administration to invest huge sums of 
money into research virtually guaranteed the development of significant technology with 
77 Geoffrey Howe, lecture given at Royal United Services Institute on 15 March 1985, printed in 
Journal of the RUSI 130, no. 2 (June 1985): 6. 
78 Ibid, 7. 
79 Daalder, 16. 
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applications in other fields unrelated to missile defense. Britain hoped to gain access to 
such technology, and participation would prevent a widening transatlantic technology gap. 
Additionally, U.S. SDI representatives had spent months in Great Britain trying to 
determine what British research would be of interest to the United States, and trying to 
develop support within the British scientific community. As a result, several fields of 
research, including rail gun technology, battery power systems, software and battle 
management systems, optical computers and conventional missiles
80 became potential 
contributions to the U.S. effort, and British officials realized that they could not prevent 
British firms from bidding for contracts. Instead, it was deemed to be wiser to participate 
on a governmental level in order to protect the interests ofBritish firms and provide 
oversight for the entire program. Another motivating concern was the fear that research 
funding in the United States would draw British scientists away, and that such a "brain 
drain" would further damage the technological capabilities of the nation. 
81 
In December 1985, a formal participation agreement was signed between the 
United States and Great Britain. Although exact terms were kept secret, provisions were 
made to ensure technology transfer rights benefited British interests, and eighteen areas of 
research participation were delineated. No preset funding was established (British officials 
had initially sought $1.5 billion out of the $26 billion SDI total
82), but U.S. officials 
emphasized that the agreement would lead to a significant number of British contracts. 
The United States was now able to claim support within the Atlantic Alliance. In turn, 
80 Taylor, "The British Response," 135. 
81 Yost, "Western Europe and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative," 297-298. 
82 Taylor, "Britain's Response to the Strategic Defense Initiative," 223. 
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Great Britain was able to rea.ffirm, according to David Yost, "solidarity with the U.S. 
president in order to help maintain the unique U.S.-British programs of cooperation in 
various areas of security policy, notably intelligence and nuclear weapons matters."83 By 
emphasizing the research and techpological aspects of the SDI, British government 
officials were able to participate without directly addressing the weightier issues 
associated with the HMD program. 
Within the British government itself, opposition parties were opposed to the entire 
SDI program, and even the Conservative Party was split. The Labour Party's position 
was provided by its leader, Neil Kinnock, who described the SDI as "deluded, 
destabilizing and dangerous," and '1he biggest single block to nuclear arms reduction. "84 
A more formal Labour Party statement emerged in July 1985 and condemned SDI as 
damaging to the deterrent capabilities of second-strike facilities and harmful to arms 
control efforts, and Labour proposed a Europe-wide rejection of SDI participation. 
Similarly, the Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance issued a statement outlining its primary 
criticisms of the Reagan proposal. Disruption of the Atlantic Alliance, an accelerating 
arms race, increasing Third World nuclear proliferation, and East-West destabilization 
were just a few of the main arguments. 85 Finally, a number of prominent Conservative 
Party members, including former Prime Minister Edward Heath, expressed disapproval of 
the program. With two political parties openly opposed to advanced BMD research, and 
the ruling Conservative Party divided as well, it becomes clear that the economic and 
83 Yost, "Western Europe and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative," 297. 
84 Neil Kinnock, cited in Yost, "Western Europe and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative," 298. 
85 Taylor, "The British Response," 139-140. 
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technological factors played an important role in British participation in the SDI research 
program. 
Most of the debate within the British government and defense community 
addressed issues not directly related to the British strategic arsenal. One possible reason 
for this is that the British government had made major decisions prior to the SDI debate 
which extended the effectiveness of the submarine-launched arsenal. The costly Chevaline 
program, which modified and improved the penetration ability of the Polaris warhead 
against existing and future Soviet BMD development, demonstrated the British 
recognition that improvements in BMD technology, beyond the limitations of the ABM 
Treaty, might occur.86 The decision to transition to the Trident D-5 missile system was 
also a precautionary step to ensure the survivability of the British deterrent force. While 
preserving the ABM Treaty provided the best opportunity to safeguard their arsenal, 
British planners had taken steps to operate in less optimistic conditions. British strategic 
planners felt secure that if SDI research spawned Soviet competition, a comfortable 
margin of several years existed to take additional steps necessary to secure the 
effectiveness of their deterrent. 
87 
In summary, British policy towards the Strategic Defense Initiative reflected the 
daunting task of balancing transatlantic relations with economic and technological 
concerns, Alliance cohesion, and promoting the continuance of security based on 
deterrence and the conditions established by the ABM Treaty. By participating in SDI 
research, British officials hoped to be able to influence U.S. decisions on deployment 
86 Yost, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance," 149-150. 
87 Stares, 332. 
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through adherence to Thatcher's four points, benefit from the technological spin-offs of 
the research, and demonstrate solidarity which might shore up confidence in a U.S. 
commitment to European defense. Whatever the influence of Great Britain, the Atlantic 
Alliance remained strong, arms control talks resumed with the Soviets, and deterrence 
survived as the fundamental security policy of the Western world. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union, which some would say was hastened by the SDI spending, has shifted the 
balance of power, and opened the door to new threats. Addressing those threats provides 
a new challenge to British-American relations. 
C. GREAT BRITAIN AND BMD IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
There is no question that the security environment of 1996 is dramatically different 
from that of 1986. The conventional threat to Western Europe has disappeared, as former 
Warsaw Pact members vie for admittance into the North Atlantic Alliance. U.S. and 
Russian missiles target open ocean and nuclear weapons dismantlement accounts for 
considerable resources. At the same time, the Gulf War apparently ushered in a return to 
a multi-polar world and awakened the potential for new enemies with dangerous WMD 
capabilities. Bridging the gap between the Cold War and post-Cold War environment has 
been a challenge for planners around the globe, as old policies now fail to meet new 
threats, and untested strategies must take their place. 
1. A New Perspective 
Perhaps one of the best examples of the "old meeting the new" involves former 
Prime Minister Thatcher. The Thatcher of 1986 believed the Strategic Defense Initiative 
to be a threat to the deterrence policy which had provided so much for East-West stability. 
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Arms control, political dialogue, and mutual cooperation were the routes to g
reater 
security, buoyed by the 1972 ABM Treaty and its limitations on BMD deployme
nt. 
However, on 9 March 1996, exactly fifty years after Winston Churchill's prophe
tic "Iron 
Curtain" speech, former Prime Minister Thatcher delivered a speech at Westm
inster 
College in Fulton, Missouri espousing some dramatically different views. Her
 new 
message emphasized the "potential contribution of ballistic missile defense to 
peace and 
security," and stressed the urgency of action to avoid the risk that '1housands
 of people 
may be killed by an attack which forethought and wise preparation might have
 
prevented. "88 
Lady Thatcher suggested five reason why she now fully supports U.S. Republ
ican-
led efforts to proceed directly with BMD development. First, BMD would of
fer 
protection against limited or unauthorized missile attack, or in the event that d
eterrence 
fails. Second, it would enable the United States and other Western powers to
 project 
power overseas by protecting deployed troops and civilian populations at hom
e. Third, 
BMD would provide regional stability by limiting a state's ability to upset the
 balance of 
power through the use of ballistic missiles. Fourth, BMD would strengthen, r
ather than 
weaken, retaliatory deterrent capability against a hostile nuclear weapons state
. Fifth, by 
reducing the utility of offensive balli~tic missiles, B:MD would strengthen diplomatic 
efforts.89 The contrast between Lady Thatcher's old and new arguments coul
d not be 
more stark. Her support for Jesse Helms and other conservatives "who argue
 that the 





ABM Treaty is a Cold War relic with no relevance to an age when up to 20 countries 
have, or will soon acquire long range missiles,"90 is a prime demonstration of the different 
challenges policy makers face in the post-Cold War world. 
2. British Conservatism 
While former Prime Minister Thatcher has shifted gears, in response to her shifting 
perception of the security environment, the current British government has been more 
conservative in changing security policy. On the most general level, the British view of 
strategic deterrence remains intact. In 1994 Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind 
expressed his belief that Russia remained a major military power in Europe, and that the 
British deterrent force continues to play as important a role as it did during the Cold 
War.91 According to the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996, "the four boat Trident 
fleet will ensure that we can maintain continuous strategic deterrent patrols and a 
continuously available sub-strategic capability throughout the life ofthe Trident force."92 
Even as it reduces the size and variety of its nuclear force, the British government 
maintains the belief in the contribution that its nuclear forces makes to maintaining peace 
and stability in Europe. For this reason, the ABM Treaty remains an important boundary 
which limits Russian capabilities. U.S. efforts to withdraw from or adjust the treaty could 
force Great Britain to expend scarce defense resources upgrading offensive missile 
systems in the future ifRussia were to improve BMD. British concerns have reportedly 
90 Bruce Clark, "Lady Thatcher Unleashes Star Wars Broadside in U.S.," Financial Times, 11 
March 1996, p. 2. 
91 Nicholas Witney, "British Nuclear Policy After the Cold War," Survival 36, no. 4 (Winter 
1994-95): 101. 
92 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996, Chapter 2, Section 201. 
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been expressed to U.S. officials in response to U.S. negotiations with the Russians to 
effect treaty clarification. 
93 
As the Statement on the Defence Estimates indicates, the Trident fleet has also 
assumed the task of maintaining a "continuously available sub-strategic capability." This 
role was first examined in 1993 during the annual government review of the Trident 
program, at which time the necessity of proceeding with the four -boat construction 
program was questioned. The government discussed placing a number of small, tactical 
nuclear warheads on a portion of the U.S. built Trident D-5 missiles on each submarine, in 
place of the maximum eight warheads designed for more traditional strategic use. The 
tactical warheads would provide the sub-strategic capability, and provide a justifiable 
reason for the continued development of the submarine deterrent force. 
94 The use of a 
tactical nuclear warhead would serve as a deterrent to a nuclear armed aggressor, or 
possibly an adversary armed with other forms ofWMD. 
The majority of British HMO debate revolves around the reluctant acceptance that 
a legitimate missile threat may exist to the United Kingdom within ten years, and the 
acknowledgment that the threat already exists to British troops deployed abroad. For this 
reason, it is in Great Britain's interest to support ongoing research efforts in the United 
States, as such research would most likely benefit U.S. allies in the future. Also, 
reductions in defense budgets leave very little to support indigenous B.MD research. Still, 
the solutions are far from clear, and there is no consensus yet on a British BMD policy. 
93 Jack Mendelsohn and Dunbar Lockwood, "U.S., Russia Set New 'Principles' To Address 
ABM-TMD Dispute," Arms Control Today 25, no. 5 (June 1995): 23. 
94 Severin Carrell, "SubmergedinaMurkyFuture," The Scotsman, 7 July 1993, downloaded 
from Lexis-Nexis server. 
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3. Conflicting Approaches 
In May 1994, the House of Commons Defence Committee advised the Ministry of 
Defence to proceed with missile defense research in the belief that some form of missile 
defense could be available by the tum of the century.95 More specifically, in a June 1995 
interview, Defence Procurement Minister Roger Freeman indicated that "Club Mad" 
nations in North Africa and the Middle East would have the capability to reach the United 
Kingdom within a ten year window, and that some defense must be sought. 96 
Freeman also indicated London's commitment to support a theater-wide missile 
defense for Europe, under the NATO umbrella. Any such program, according to Freeman 
should involve both short-range systems; like the Patriot missile, and longer-range systems 
which provide a wider area of coverage. If a threat to the British Isles was ten years 
away, Freeman maintained that deployed British troops could today find themselves within 
range of a ballistic missile threat.97 With the increasing likelihood of British involvement 
in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, relying on the United States for TMD 
protection could place undue restriction on policy decision making. Freeman emphasized 
the need for both national and European discussion of the problem. 
In 1995 a British computer company unveiled the world's most advanced ballistic 
missile attack simulator. The U.K. Extended Air Defence Test Bed (UKEADTB) is a 
computer modeling system capable of generating simulated attack by aircraft, cruise 
95 Steven Hildreth and Jason Ellis, "Allied Support for Theater Missile Defense," Orbis 40, no. 1 
(Winter 1996): 106. 
96 Michael Evans, "Britain Must Build Defences Against Club Mad Missiles," Times (London), 
12 June 1995, p. 7. 
97 Charles Miller, "Britain Endorses NATO Missile Defense Effort," Defense News, 12-18 June 
1995, p. 8. 
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missiles, or ballistic missiles in order to develop BMD technology. The system was 
funded primarily by the United States as a result of the cooperation agreements established 
during the SDI research phase in the mid-1980s, and is generating high interest in other 
European countries concerned with a potential missile threat. 
98 
Although Roger Freeman's vocal support for a NATO-led European program, and 
the development of the UKEADTB suggest movement in the direction ofBMD, British 
government action has been more hesitant. Great Britain remained uninterested as the 
United States, France, Germany, and Italy established an unprecedented multilateral 
organization to develop the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). Freeman 
stated that 'that deals with only part of the problem," and was wary of MEADS, due to its 
range limitations and intended use to protect small, mobile forces. 
99 It is unclear why 
Great Britain would not want to be involved in addressing even "part of the problem." 
Yet in light of such developments, a March 1995 House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee report reopened the debate on the wisdom ofBMD. The report, 
entitled The UK Policy on Weapons Proliferation and Arms Control in the Post-Cold 
War Era, determined that proliferation is a political situation, only effectively countered by 
political solutions, and that "an emphasis on military answers is short term at best. "
100 
Reminiscent of the debate of the 1980s, the report indicates that support for the ABM 
Treaty and political dialogue remains in some government circles, and that consensus 
within the British government may not be coming soon. 
98 Christopher Bellamy, "Britain Builds 'Star Wars' Missile Attack Model," The Independent, 2 
July 1995, 11. 
99 Miller, 8. 
100 Stanley Orman, "Defense Binds U.S., British," Defense News, 29 May -4 June 1995, p. 23. 
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In an attempt to clarifY and resolve some of the British debate on HMO, the 
Defense Ministry contracted a team led by British Aerospace to conduct a "Pre-Feasibility 
Study" (PFS) on missile defense. According to the Statement on the Defence Estimates 
1995, the purpose of the PFS was to: 
identify practical defensive architectures against a range of scenarios, 
taking account of costs, risks, and timescales as well as technical and 
industrial considerations ... also to take account of current and past American 
and British research in this area. 101 
In general terms, the PFS was a needs assessment to, first, determine the needs of the 
nation, and second, provide recommendations as to the best course to pursue. The study 
was completed in spring 1996 and remains under review at the Ministry of Defense. 
Sources indicate that the PFS may be made public in December 1996, and that a more 
comprehensive government policy may soon follow. 102 
One of the possible reasons that the British government has been hesitant to 
commit to the technical development ofBMD technology may be the political questions 
which remain unanswered. It is generally believed that London would be a more likely 
target than some of the other European capitals, and that geography plays an important 
role in intercepting an incoming missile. A March 1996 House of Commons Defence 
Committee Report, entitled ''NATO's Southern Flank," hints at the problem. Referring to 
Iraq's Scud attacks during the Gulf War, the report states that: 
incoming missiles which were shot down were intercepted towards the end 
of their flight with the consequence that their remains fell on friendly 
territory. Had they contained chemical warheads with mass destructive 
101 correspondence with David Bosdet, 5 November 1996. 
102 Ibid. 
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capability they could have inflicted great damage, despite being intercepted.
103 
Transposed to a European theater, a defense similar to the Patriot system could still result 
in terrible tragedy if a chemical warhead were intercepted over London. Ideally, then, 
interception would occur earlier in the missile's flight, with the unfortunate result that 
WMD debris could possibly fall on the territory of another country, most likely France or 
Italy. The possibility emerges that an action of Great Britain could incite a retaliatory 
missile attack, with tragic results for a third country.
104 Clarifying the political 
implications of a European, or wide area British, missile defense may be an important 
consideration that is holding Great Britain back from a more aggressive program. 
D. SUMMARY 
For British policy makers during the Cold War, and primarily during the debate 
surrounding the Strategic Defense Initiative, adherence to the status quo was desirable as 
a means to maintain stability. The limited nature of their strategic deterrence was 
safeguarded by the ABM Treaty, and the desire to nurture peace in Europe encouraged 
dialogue with the Soviets rather than confrontation. SDI, and its possible implications to 
the ABM Treaty represented an upheaval that challenged the policy goals of the British 
government. By walking the tightrope between cooperation With, and disapproval of, the 
United States, the British policy was able to meet domestic needs (economic, 
technological, and political), while promoting British opinion in the international debate. 
103 
"NATO's Southern Flank," House of Commons Defence Committee Third Report, 13 March 
1996, downloaded from www.cdiss.org. 
104 Bosdet. 
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In the post-Cold War world, BMD development by the United States also 
challenges the British government to walk the narrow path between alliance commitment 
and domestic policy. The recognized need for TMD to support deployed troops, the 
growing awareness of the need to think seriously about defending British territory, and the 
need to support NATO missile defense efforts must all be weighed against shrinking 
military budgets, and an underlying British belief that political means, backed by a nuclear 
arsenal, are the best approach to deterring offensive missile threats. Until Great Britain is 
able to distinguish clearly what its BMD requirements are, it will continue to be caught 
between cooperation and isolation. The inability of the British government to define a 
BMD policy consistent with the United States did not disappear with the end of the Cold 
War, and U.S. policy makers must consider that this inconsistency will continue to 
interfere with the development ofNATO planning. 
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IV. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND FRANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Strategic Defense Initiative posed problems for France which at first appeared 
similar to those facing Great Britain: the effectiveness of the independent strategic arsenal 
was placed in jeopardy by potential Soviet HMD enhancements instigated by the U.S. 
initiative. The security that the ABM Treaty provided was threatened, and the SDI was 
the first BMD initiative which caused significant concern in France. While the British 
eventually shifted to limited cooperation with the United States program, the French 
government steadfastly rejected the U.S. offer to participate in the SDI research effort. 
For France, the challenge posed by the SDI went beyond strategic issues, to the economic 
and political realms. More fundamentally, the SDI challenged the grandeur of France and 
its place on the world stage by its potential threat to nuclear deterrence, a key component 
of French national security policy. In response, the Socialist government ofFranyois 
Mitterand chose open criticism, arms control initiatives, and substitute European programs 
to counter the U.S. defense plan. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, France has 
reconsidered its role in the defense of Europe, the shape of its military force, and its 
relationship to NATO. Additionally, WMD and ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle 
East and the Mediterranean region has forced a reappraisal of missile defense as one 
component of a wider nonproliferation agenda. However, recent French actions have 
demonstrated the difficulty in defining a BMD policy consistent with that of its allies, and 
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the autonomous French perspective remains. The apparent continued reliance on its 
independent nuclear arsenal to deter a "rogue state" missile attack, and its withdrawal 
from a multinational BMD program indicate that France and the United States still have 
little in common regarding missile defense. Until these differences are narrowed or 
eliminated, the degree of cooperation between France and the other NATO governments 
on this and other security policies will be restricted. 
B. FRENCH REACTION TO THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 
There was no immediate French response to President Reagan's March 1983 SDI 
speech, as officials waited to see whether the rhetoric would be translated into action. By 
September 1983 the first hints ofFrench opinion emerged during a speech given by 
President Mitterand to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In an address 
devoted mainly to disarmament, President Mitterand proposed that the five declared 
nuclear powers gather to discuss reductions in existing arsenals, providing that three 
conditions were met. First, the United States and Soviet Union had to commit to 
substantial cuts in their own nuclear arsenals. Second, the conventional force capabilities 
of Europe had to be fortified to reduce the imbalance which favored the Soviet Union, 
while, at the same time, chemical and biological weapons stockpiling had to be outlawed. 
Third, President Mitterand warned that "space is in its very essence the common heritage 
of humanity" and demanded an end to the further development of anti-missile, anti-
submarine, and anti-satellite weapons. 105 The implicit reference to the development of 
105 John Fenske, "France and the Strategic Defence Initiative: Speeding Up or Putting on the 
Brakes?" International Affairs 62, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 232. 
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"Star Wars" weapons suggested that President Reagan's proposal was not warmly 
received by the French government or President Mitterand. 
1. The Emergence of French Opposition 
On 7 February 1984, President Mitterand introduced his preference for European 
autonomy by proposing the creation of a ''European space community" which would work 
cooperatively to launch a manned space station ''to observe, transmit, and counter any 
threat. " 106 The speech came only days after President Reagan invited European 
cooperation on a very similar project. By emphasizing the desire to act apart from 
American initiatives, the proposal was the first attempt to demonstrat~ French 
unwillingness to cooperate with the United States. Instead, French intentions were to 
foster European self-sufficiency in technological and industrial areas and to ensure that 
Europe was not left behind in the development of space. 
It was in June 1984 at the United Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva that 
France formally introduced a draft proposal of what President Mitterand had suggested in 
September of the previous year. The French representative, Franyois de la Gorce, argued 
that both Soviet and U.S. BMD programs risked destabilizing political relations between 
East and West. He also reiterated the French government's support for the 1972 ABM 
Treaty and for the effectiveness of deterrence. The proposal, which resembled past Soviet 
efforts, suggested the limitation ofBMD development before irreversible results occurred. 
Specifically, the French plan proposed banning the testing and deployment of directed 
energy weapons systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites for an initial 
106 Hans Gunter Brauch, "Europe and Strategic Defense: From SDI to TDI," in Daniel Papp and 
John Mcintyre, eds. International Space Policy, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), 292. · 
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five year interval, and placing further restrictions on anti-satellite weapons. 107 The Soviet 
Union responded positively to this proposal, while the United States was displeased. 
The French effort in Geneva was designed to bring the United States and Soviet 
Union back to the negotiating table, while also demonstrating France's commitment to the 
ABM Treaty and the value of deterrence. It also raised French concerns that ifBMD 
development continued, a superpower arms race in non-ballistic weapons, including cruise 
missiles, might break out. Additionally, French officials began expressing fears that a 
growing distinction between those countries that possessed BMD capabilities and those 
that did not but which nonetheless faced a ballistic missile threat, would weaken relations 
between allies. 108 While these arguments were not unique to the French position, the 
attempt to impede the SDI through the Geneva proposal demonstrated that French 
opposition was more decisive that that of the other allies. 
French criticism continued to mount in the following months, and peaked during 
the winter of 1984-1985. In two separate forums French government officials were 
extremely outspoken on SDI. During a television interview on 14 December 1984 
Mitterand spoke directly about the SDI for the first time, remarking that: 
President Reagan's proposal ... amounts to overarmament. It is not in this 
direction we should be heading, but rather towards disarmament .... As for 
militarizing space, by all the means which we have mentioned and many 
others, I oppose that. 109 
107 Yost, "European Anxieties about Ballistic Missile Defense," 125. 
108 Alain Carton, "French Political Reaction to SDI-The Debate on the Nature ofDeterrence," in 
Hans Gunter Brauch, ed., Star Wars and European Defence, 152. 





Shortly after, on 10 February 1985, at the annual Munich conference organized by 
Wehrkunde, the German journal of defense and military issues, French Defense Minister 
Charles Hernu argued that pursuing the SDI could result in tacit complicity between the 
United States and the Soviet union to create invulnerable homelands while settling 
differences elsewhere--namely in Europe. 110 
The United States became concerned that continued French opposition might 
damage U.S. attempts to garner political support from other Alliance members, and also 
that fractures in Alliance ideology could weaken the U.S. position at the Intermediate 
Nuclear Force (INF) bargaining table with the Soviets. Following a preliminary arms 
control meeting between U.S. and Soviet representatives to discuss the potential for future 
talks, Paul Nitze and Robert McFarlane traveled to Paris to try to reassure the French. 
According to Nitze and McFarlane, the United States maintained strong support for the 
independent French nuclear arsenal, reaffirmed the importance of nuclear deterrence "until 
at least the end of this century," and vowed to resist Soviet attempts to discuss the British 
and French strategic forces in future disarmament meetings.
111 
French officials were aware of the tenuous course they were trying to pursue, and 
were pleased with the American position. It would be difficult to appear to side with the 
Soviet Union in terms of the Strategic Defense Initiative and still expect U.S. support on 
the INF issue. The result was a slight respite from the harsh criticism aimed at all phases 
of the SDI, and even a limited amount of support. In late February 1985 French Foreign 
110 George Wilson, "French Minister Warns Against 'Star Wars' Plan," Washington Post, 10 
February 1985, p. A17. 
111 Fenske, 234. 
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Minister Roland Dumas stated that the U.S. plan was attractive because it offered the 
possibility of replacing an "aggressive" policy founded on the principles of nuclear 
retaliation with a "defensive" philosophy based on a shield against nuclear weapons. 112 
While not a full endorsement of SDI, it was probably the zenith of French support 
throughout the SDI debate. 
2. The EUREKA Counterproposal 
Even as criticism diminished, counterproposals continued to emerge. Within a 
month of Secretary ofDefense Weinberger's 25 March 1985 invitation to allies to 
participate in the research portion of the SDI, President Mitterand responded with the 
proposal for a European Research Coordination Agency. EUREKA, as it came to be 
known, was proposed as a research program for Europe which would place greater 
emphasis on the civilian application of technological developments. The EUREKA 
program was designed to research virtually all of the areas that participation in the SDI 
program would have offered, including information science, robot technology, artificial 
intelligence, communications, biotechnology, and the development of new materials. 113 
EUREKA's advantages, as the French seemed to see them, included the 
development of technology, in a way that would emphasize European autonomy. 
Additionally, the problems associated with technology transfer rights from the United 
States would be averted, and the scientific community would remain involved in research 
for Europe, diminishing any ''brain drain" resulting from the SD I program. The primary 
disadvantage remained economic. While the United States invited participation from 
112 
"France is Warming to 'Star Wars' Idea," New York Times, 27 February 1985, p. A3. 
113 Alain Carton, "The Implications of SDI for French Defense Policy," in Brauch, 346. 
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Allies, encouraging foreign companies to bid on SDI contracts paid for by U.S. dollars, 
EUREKA would have to be budgeted by European participants. In the coming months, 
Great Britain and West Germany offered verbal support for the concept of a European 
research effort, but both countries were non-committal when it came to financing the 
venture. EUREKA was one of the most concrete examples of the French effort to derail 
the SDI, or at least to coordinate a European rejection and send a strong message to 
Washington. 
3. French Refusal To Participate 
The official French policy on the SDI finally developed during the Western 
economic summit in Bonn, in May 1985. At the close of the summit, President Mitterand 
publicly announced, following an eighty minute private meeting with President Reagan, 
that he had firmly rejected government-to-government cooperation on the SDI. Mitterand 
expressed skepticism that the United States would allow Allies to benefit fully from the 
technological developments of SDI research, and also stated that the program could 
potentially jeopardize the peace which nuclear deterrence had produced in Europe. An 
additional aspect which led to his refusal was a belief that European partners would share 
little control over future decisions on development and deployment, and would otherwise 
not be treated as equals. During the press conference Mitterand stated, "Subcontractors. 
That's the word I heard. The word was said in English. It confirmed my intuitions."
114 In 
place of cooperation, President Mitterand again pushed the EUREKA program as the 
more effective course for Europeans, rather than "wasting their talent" on a non-European 
114 William Drodziak, "France Blocks Agreement on Start of Trade Talks," Washington Post 5 
May 1985, pp. Al & A24. 
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undertaking. 115 With this press conference, France became the first major West European 
ally to reject participation in SDI. 
4. Major Issues Behind French Policy 
President Mitterand's rejection sent a clear message about the issues vital to 
France. Preserving deterrence, maintaining the "great nation" status of France in the 
international arena, and strengthening French and European autonomy were three inter-
related issues which led to the French response. To the French government, the SDI 
threatened each of these interests, and a refusal to participate was the proper course of 
action. 
At the root of the entire French position is the commitment to nuclear deterrence, 
framed in a historical perspective. Hubert Vedrine, President Mitterand' s diplomatic 
counselor, presented this point of view: 
Let us have a little historical clear-sightedness: periods oflong peace are 
not that numerous. Let us properly appreciate this period of peace in 
which we still are and which results from this balance of deterrence. This is 
why France is extremely attached to maintaining this balance and if 
possible therefore preventing developments that would be likely to upset it. 
It is not that we have a kind of immoderate and incomprehensible love of 
nuclear arms itself ... But we have this system that guarantees peace which, 
we think, should be maintained and preserved. 116 
The SDI seemed to substitute the deterrent threat of nuclear war with a return to a 
conventional war-fighting strategy, something unacceptable to the French. For this 
reason, continued adherence to the ABM Treaty and steadfast support for a strategy of 
deterrence were key. 
115 Bernard Weinraub, "France Blocks Trade Talks as Summit Conference Ends; Reagan Presses 
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Even if the ultimate goal ofleakproof defenses were never achieved, the SDI 
would pose a considerable threat to the continued reliability of France's strategic nuclear 
deterrent force, and therefore to France's importance in the international arena. Although 
it was estimated that the effectiveness of the French deterrent would not be reduced 
before 2015 or 2020 at the earliest, 117 French officials believed the SDI would erode 
France's ability to offer a quasi-autonomous defense of Europe. Outside of the NATO 
integrated military structure since 1966, France's nuclear forces provide France with a 
sense of"greatness," derived from an ability to make military decisions on its own. In the 
French view, the diminishment of importance of its nuclear forces would reduce France's 
stature in the eyes of the rest of the world. 118 Additionally, the cost of maintaining the 
deterrent force had been at the expense of France's conventional forces, leaving it little to 
offer in the way of an independent defense of Europe. 
Closely linked to maintaining its stature was France's desire to strengthen its own 
autonomy, and that ofEurope. President Mitterand's focus on the use of the word 
"subcontractor" typifies that Gaullist response. French sovereignty and the avoidance of 
subordination had led to France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command 
nearly twenty years before, and the refusal to participate in the SDI stemmed from a "self 
definition as an independent state with a special rank to uphold. " 11
9 The "European space 
community" and EUREKA were both proposals designed to free Europe from U.S. 
117 Pierre Lellouche, "SDI and European Security: A View From France," in Sanford Lakoff and 
Randy Willoughby, eds., Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance (Lexington: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1987), 130. 
118 Richard Bernstein, "Americans at a Forum in France, Put Forward Case for 'Star Wars'," 
New York Times, 21 October 1985, p. B10. 
119 Yost, "Western Europe and the Strategic Defense Initiative," 306. 
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technological hegemony. The French were also concerned that European security would 
be placed in the hands of the Americans, with the long-term plans of the SDI to integrate 
European radars and command and control infrastructures. This only increased the desire 
to push for autonomous action. 120 
5. Political and Economic Considerations 
Political and economic factors influenced President Mitterand's rejection ofSDI at 
the Bonn Summit. French national elections were scheduled for March 1986, and the 
Socialists may have been using a strong stand against the U.S. program to improve their 
position. This theory is strengthened by the fact that the French government was 
encouraging French companies to pursue SDI research contracts, even while it was 
declaring its decision not to participate in the SDI. President Mitterand's statement at the 
Summit that ''French businesses can sell what they want to whomever will buy from them. 
I am not there like a bogeyman to prevent French business from working,"121 captures the 
inconsistency of the French position. By encouraging French companies, including 
nationalized ones, to compete, while flatly condemning the entire concept of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative, Mitterand appeared to want the economic benefits of the SDI without 
paying any political costs associated with it. 
The March 1986 elections shifted power away from the Socialists and introduced 
the cohabitation government of Socialist President Mitterand and Gaullist Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac. Many speculated that the introduction of right-wing forces might lead to 
a new government position more amenable towards the SDI, but the result was less 
120 Ibid, 308. 
121 Daalder, 81. 
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significant. While the tone of outright aggression became more subdued, no change in 
policy developed. 122 French auto~omy and a reliance on deterrence supported by the 
ABM Treaty remained the cornerstones of the French position. 
C. FRANCE AND BMD IN THE POST -COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT 
Since the GulfWar and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, France has 
questioned the validity of a number of its Cold War security policies. As a result, the 
country has reexamined its role in NATO, the structure of its own military, shifting 
security concerns, and, perhaps most significantly, its nuclear deterrence policy. As 1996 
draws to a close, France remains a nation in transition, searching for its new position in the 
multipolar world, in which the Soviet threat has vanished, replaced by potential 
adversaries in the Mediterranean theater and the Middle East. Missile defenses have 
slowly entered the political dialogue in France, as one aspect of its search for identity 
within the alliance and one possible defense against the proliferation ofWMD and ballistic 
missiles. Where BMD fits in France's future, however, remains a difficult question to 
answer. 
1. France and Nonproliferation 
Like other Western nations, France was stunned to learn of the advanced condition 
of Iraq's chemical and biological programs, and gravely concerned about the Iraqi nuclear 
development effort. The prospect of several nations in the Mediterranean theater 
obtaining WMD capability and the necessary delivery systems seemed to be only a matter 
of time, and France's geographic proximity to the region increased the sense of urgency in 
122 Yost, "Western Europe and the Strategic Defense Initiative," 310. 
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addressing the problem. Jacques Chirac, then mayor ofParis, wrote an article in 1992, 
entitled ''Proliferation--Non-Proliferation--Deterrence," in which he focused on the 
developing awareness in the French government of proliferation issues. In this article, 
Chirac stated that: 
Proliferation is no longer a theoretical problem. It represents, from now on, 
a major strategic reality of the post-Cold War period. It brings to light new 
problems, to which we need to find new responses by reinforcing the 
existing structures and creating new ones if need be. 123 
While vague in his prescription, Chirac suggested that France, along with the· rest of 
NATO, would have to refocus attention on this growing problem. 
French officials began to support increased discussion about and involvement in 
multiple approaches to nonproliferation. Political efforts would continue to be the primary 
means of encouraging nonproliferation. The role ofFrance's nuclear arsenal in deterring 
the use of nuclear weapons or other forms ofWMD against Europe, however, was 
uncertain. Because of this uncertainty, it became apparent that alternative defense 
options, including counterproliferation and ballistic missile defenses should be 
considered. 124 Missile defenses, if implemented, would be only one aspect of a wider 
French nonproliferation policy. 
2. Missile Defense as a Component of Nonproliferation 
One of the most outspoken advocates of the need to discuss French policy on 
BMD has been Henri Conze, former Director of France's Defense Procurement Agency. 
123 Chirac cited in Henri Conze, "Transatlantic Cooperation on Missile Defense: A French 
Perspective," Comparative Strategy 14, no. 4 (October-December 1995): 433. 
124 Pierre Lellouche, "France in Search of Security," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (March-April 
1993): 127. 
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ill 1993 Conze outlined a series of political concerns related to BMD which would have to 
be considered before the direction ofFrench policy could be determined. Several of the 
issues suggested the difficulty of adopting a clearly defined policy. 
First, the distrustful French attitude towards missile defense would have to change. 
The negative effects of the SDI debate of the previous decade continued to linger in the 
government offices of Paris, as did the continued fear of a new offensive arms race. Years 
of open criticism of the U.S. initiative made it difficult to simply switch course and 
approve the need for active missile defense capabilities. Distinguishing between the 
expansive "Star Wars" objectives and a limited defense against rogue states was an 
essential precursor to developing a new attitude towards BMD in France.
125 
France also would have to reexamine its autonomous role in relation to its 
European partners and the United States. For one, development of a comprehensive 
defense would require greater integration of early warning systems and response 
capabilities, a factor which had fueled French opposition to the SDI. More importantly, 
however, European governments, and ideally the United States, would have to reach some 
consensus on the nature of the threat to develop an appropriate collective response. Then 
Defense Minister Leotard supported this position, stating that the effort "can only be 
Western ... .It is necessary to work on it, but we will not be able to do it alone. "
126 An 
inability to reach a consensus became a factor in the problems surrounding the multilateral 
125 Henri Conze, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A French View," Comparative Strategy, 12, no. 1 
(January-March 1993): 85. 
126 Yost, "Nuclear Debates in France," Survival36, no. 4 (Winter 1994-95): 131-32. 
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Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a successor to the Patriot missile 
system. 
Third, the continued French involvement and influence in Africa could pose 
diplomatic difficulties if deployment of a BMD system appeared to be directed entirely to 
the South. Relations with former colonies could suffer as a result of deployment, affecting 
the position of importance which France has historically held in the region. As a result, 
any decision to proceed with BMD would require the formulation of a realistic "tous 
azimuts" doctrine to reinforce positive relations between France and those to the South. 127 
Fourth, the relationship between the responsibilities ofNATO and individual 
nations would have to be reexamined. During the Cold War, the responsibility was on a 
joint command structure which would identifY a Soviet attack and initiate the activation of 
national assets to mount a defense. In the post-Cold War world, however, a threat of 
attack would most likely involve an opposite occurrence. Rather than an attack on the 
Alliance, a threat would most likely be made against a specific country, which in this case, 
would activate collective defense assets. Redefining this relationship would be essential to 
the establishment of an effective defense. 128 
Finally, Conze emphasized the diversity of threats facing Europe, due to its 
geographical location. In addition to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and 
terrorist action are concerns which would have to be addressed. The fact that the SDI 
would meet only ballistic missile threats was viewed as a limitation during the 1980s, and 
additional French requirements continued to exist in the 1990s. For France, then, effective 
127 Conze, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A French View," 85. 
128 Ibid. 
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defenses would have to exceed B:MD, and would have to include broader extended air 
defense capabilities. 129 
The French attitude toward BMD in the first few years of discussion can best be 
described as reluctant acceptance. The growing awareness of the threat, balanced by the 
political difficulties of developing a policy, left the French government uncertain as to how 
to proceed, and cautious in its development plans. To further complicate the issue, French 
policy makers were reevaluating their deterrence strategy to determine the role France's 
nuclear deterrent would play in the new security environment. 
3. Defining a New Position on BMD 
In 1994 France issued its Defense White Paper, the first in twenty-two years, to 
clarify its position on the new strategic realities of the post-Cold War period. The white 
paper discussed both the dangers of proliferation to France and the role of nuclear 
deterrence, but did little to set a course for future French policy on either issue. On 
proliferation, the paper stated that: 
arms of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical) associated or 
not with ballistic missiles, will pose a new problem to our defense apparatus. 
This problem is posed both for the defense of our territory and for those 
French forces deployed abroad .... Given the diversity of forms which these 
threats can take, principally by diversified launchers, missiles and especially 
ballistic missiles priority will be given in this domain to the study of a 
concept and the means for an enlarged air defense. 130 
As a formal declaration, the white paper confirmed the desire to defend deployed troops 
and home territory, yet emphasized that any defense must handle threats beyond ballistic 
129 Ibid, 86. . 
130 Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition (Washington, D.C.: National University 
Press, 1995), 39. 
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missiles. One possible alternative explanation for France's emphasis on extended air 
defense is the extensive cost and technical difficulties associated with effective BMD 
development. 131 
Regarding deterrence, the white paper indicated that '1:he principle that deterrence 
must by no means be discarded is, of course, maintained, but it will come second to the 
capability of participating in the settlement of regional crises. " 132 This reference to 
participation in regional crises indicates a greater role for conventional forces and a less 
significant reliance on the "non-war" nuclear deterrent force. The white paper, however, 
failed to define under what circumstances the nuclear deterrent force would be used 
instead of conventional forces. While the white paper is not a strategic blueprint for case-
by-case responses, the ambiguity suggests that defense policy makers were unclear how 
the two choices, nuclear deterrence or conventional power, would be applied in the future. 
If the white paper failed to clarify French policy, a report published by the National 
Assembly shortly before the white paper was issued only added to the confusion. 
Proliferation was raised as an important issue, yet this report differed in regards to 
deterrence and BMD. While the white paper had indicated a French desire to pursue 
defensive measures, the National Assembly report stated that such defenses could only 
provide limited defense, that costs were prohibitive, and that "defense systems 
would ... hurt the credibility of nuclear deterrence. " 133 The differences in the two 
documents belies the uncertainty of the government. 
131 Yost, "Nuclear Debates in France," 132. 
132 Laird, 42. 
133 Ibid., 41. 
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An additional factor in France's ambivalence to B:MD in recent years has been 
budgetary constraints placed on France's armed forces. Fortifying conventional forces 
which had suffered during the Cold War is consuming a greater portion of a shrinking 
budget, and as a result, the level of weapons spending devoted to nuclear weapons has 
declined to 19.1 billion francs, a forty percent decrease from the 1990 budget of35.8 
billion francs. 134 The loss of defense spending power places severe limitations on the 
number of defense projects in which France is able to participate. 
4. MEADS 
One of the most visible examples of France's financial constraints is its withdrawal 
from the multinational MEADS program. What began as a bilateral U.S. -German 
program to develop a mobile anti-missile system designed to provide 360 degree 
protection for deployed troops, became a multilateral program when, on 20 February 
1995, the United States, Germany, France, and Italy signed a letter of intent to cooperate 
on the project. France and Italy, the late-comers were interested in the system's intended 
capability to address both tactical ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats (cruise missiles 
and aircraft) to a range of up to sixty miles. For the French, the versatility of the system 
seemed to meet the extended air defense need that were frequently cited by defense 
officials. Other sources suggest that French interest stemmed for a desire to prevent the 
formation of an exclusive partnership between Germany and the United States. 
135 The 
initial agreement stated that the United States would contribute fifty percent, while France 
134 Giovanni de Briganti, "France Continues to Pare Down Nuclear Forces," Defense News , 14-
20 October 1996, p. 40. 
135 de Briganti, "France May Pull Out of :MEADS Program," Defense News, 15-21 Apri11996, p. 
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and Germany would provide twenty percent each, with Italy providing the final ten 
percent. 
By spring 1996, however, it became apparent that France was reconsidering its 
commitment to the project. Germany and Italy had committed to the joint effort, and a 
ceremony to sign the Memorandum ofUnderstanding was scheduled for 28 March 1996. 
Pentagon officials were forced to notify their German and Italian counterparts that the 
signing would be postponed when the French government requested an extension. 136 
President Chirac's comprehensive review of France's defense department, which resulted 
in large-scale reductions in troop strength, plans to end conscription, and increased efforts 
to reduce equipment spending, had temporarily paralyzed the French decision making 
process. Jean-Yves Helmer, Henri Cone's replacement as Director of the Defense 
Procurement Agency, indicated that new budget restrictions prevented France from 
funding the program all the way through to its conclusion, and policy makers were 
therefore reluctant to spend any money at all. 137 
In addition to the cost of the MEADS program, a second reason France was 
hesitant to sign the MOU was its previous commitment to the bilateral Franco-Italian Sol-
Air Moyenne-Portee/Terre (SAMP/T), a ground-launched, medium-range air defense 
missile under design to replace the aging Hawk air defense system. The cost of 
participating in both programs was beyond France's capability,·and French designers were 
considering the possibility of adding a limited capability to defend against tactical ballistic 
136 
"Kaminski to French: Fish or Cut Bait on MEADS," Defense Week, 25 March 1996, 
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missiles to the Franco-Italian system. 138 Finally, on 16 April1996, France notified its 
partners that it would be withdrawing its support, citing financial inability to commit to the 
entire program. 
5. Deterrence or Defense? 
After several years of increasing support, France's involvement in a BMD program 
that appeared to meet its strategic requirements fell victim to monetary constraints. What 
followed the announcement was a puzzling reversal of opinion regarding French attitudes 
towards BMD and deterrence. To begin with, Henri Conze had frequently described the 
"common operational requirements" with.Germany that MEADS satisfied, and 
emphasized that MEADS was the first step in addressing the nonproliferation challenge 
facing the Alliance. In a recent interview, however, French Defense Minister Charles 
Millon simply stated that '1he MEADS project does not meet our strategic 
requirements ... " 139 Millon failed to expand on how France's strategic requirements had 
changed within the last six months. 
Other officials went further to defend the withdrawal from MEADS. Jean-Paul 
Gillyboeuf, Director of Strategy at the Ministry ofDefense's Procurement Agency, 
indicated that France's best defense for deployed troops and French territory remained the 
nuclear arsenal, and that truly effective missile defense would cost France money it could 
not afford to spend and take too many years. "The nuclear deterrent is always a good 
1381bid 
139 
"One on One," Defense News, 14-20 October 1996, p. 110. 
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solution and it costs less," stated Gillyboeuf, who also believes ''there does not exist a 
system able to fight a very effective missile. " 140 
French actions seem to support this view. While strategic nuclear forces are being 
substantially reduced in number, France has committed itself to improving the capabilities 
of its tactical nuclear forces. Officials indicate that short-range tactical weapons will now 
act as a deterrent for rogue regimes tempted to launch a missile attack against French 
territory or other vital interests. Other officials suggest that fighter aircraft, armed with 
either nuclear or conventional long-range missiles are a more effective deterrent to rogue 
states than a HMO system. 141 Both options demonstrate that France may once again be 
moving away from pursuing missile defenses and returning to a reliance on nuclear 
weapons for deterrence. 
D. SUMMARY 
With its refusal to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative, France 
demonstrated its unique view of alliance relations, cooperation, and the defense of Europe. 
Adherence to a deterrence strategy is not solely a French belief, but its linkage to French 
autonomy and "Great Nation" status makes the argument particularly unique. Through its 
open criticism of the SDI, alternative European proposals, and BMD-related arms control 
procedures, France tried to derail the U.S. program to maintain the credibility of its 
deterrent, shore up European autonomy, and demonstrate its continued importance on the 
world stage. 
p.6. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, French government officials have realized the 
growing need to address the proliferation ofWMD and ballistic missiles. They have also 
shown a willingness to foster greater cooperation with European and transatlantic allies to 
advance nonproliferation efforts. Budgetary constraints, unclear strategic requirements, 
and an inability to reconcile the role of its independent nuclear deterrent are making it 
difficult for France to develop a coherent policy regarding ballistic missile defense. The 
concerns which dominated the debate during the 1980s are mostly gone, and have been 
replaced by uncertainty and confusion. However, this confusion continues to hinder 
improved Alliance relations, and the result is largely the same as it was during the SDI 
debate. Divergent BMD policies will divide the United States, France, and NATO, and 
make it difficult to enhance relations and cooperative efforts. 
87 
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V. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND GERMANY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines Germany's involvement with the United States and its 
ballistic missile defense efforts. As a non-nuclear power, and the front-line nation in a 
potential East-West conflict, Germany was reliant on the United States for its commitment 
to extended deterrence. For this reason the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the acceptance of 
MAD, reassured the German government that the United States would choose deterrence 
over strategic missile defense. This chapter addresses Germany's reaction to the U.S. 
Strategic Defense Initiative, the first major challenge to the deterrence structure and the 
first U.S. BMD program that directly affected NATO's deterrent strategy. The SDI 
debate demonstrated the strategic inconsistencies between the United States and Germany 
and caused significant tension between these two allies. The pursuit of improved relations 
with its eastern neighbors was offset by Germany's desire to enhance the bond with the 
Alliance, and the result was an ambiguous German policy which achieved little. 
The end of the Cold War left Germany with the daunting task of integrating East 
Germany into the unified state. Additional attention has been devoted to the task of 
addressing the security vacuum immediately to the east of Germany's borders. The 
strategic concerns of the "Star Wars" period have dissipated in the face of new realities, 
such as German "out of area" deployments, and the weakness of extended deterrence 
guarantees. As a result, missile defense has quietly become an accepted policy in the 
government, while the focus remains on reunification and NATO expansion. Active 
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involvement in the MEADS program and the planned purchase of other TMD systems 
indicate that Germany is currently pursuing a policy that shares common goals with the 
United States. However, resources devoted to other issues which the German 
government deems more important, shrinking defense budgets, and a general lack of 
enthusiasm for BMD may lead to a reduced commitment in the future. 
B. WEST GERMAN REACTION TO THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE 
INITIATIVE 
For the Federal Republic of Germany, President Reagan's speech introducing the 
Strategic Defense Initiative was the stimulus for another controversy within the 
government and for another foreign policy challenge. As in other nations in Europe, 
reactions developed slowly in West Germany, and attention in 1983 remained focused on 
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) debate. The West German commitment to deploy 
American Pershing and cruise missiles in the face of domestic opposition and intense 
Soviet disapproval was viewed by West German leaders as a demonstration of Alliance 
loyalty. More importantly, the INF issue was illustrative of West German fears of 
American withdrawal or U.S. hesitation to commit fully to the defense ofEurope. The 
introduction ofU.S. intermediate range missiles into the European theater helped allay 
West German concerns that the U. S. would fail to escalate to nuclear warfare, if 
necessary, in response to a Soviet or Warsaw Pact advance. 142 Additionally, the 
deployment suggested a U.S. willingness to strengthen deterrence in the European theater .. 
With Reagan's speech, however, the proposed shift from deterrence to defense once again 
142 Jonathan Dean, "Will NATO Survive Ballistic Missile Defense?" Journal oflnternational 
Affairs 39, no. 1 (Summer 1985): 103. 
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raised the question ofU.S. commitment to Europe. Particularly unsettling was Reagan's 
attack on the "morality" of the deterrence policy. 
1. Early West German Concerns 
Initial West German response, while minimal, was almost entirely negative. 
Minister ofDefense, Manfred Worner dismissed Reagan's "Krieg der Sterne" as 
insignificant and irrelevant to security issues before the 21st century, but suggested that 
the introduction of such a system might be beneficial to East-West relations by 
demonstrating the defensive nature of the NATO Alliance. West German government 
spokesman Jurgen Sudhoff made similar comments and emphasized that a shift from 
deterrence to defense would result in uncertainty within the Alliance. While the ruling 
coalition parties, which included the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian 
Socialist Union (CSU), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) were cautiously negative, 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was openly opposed to the SDI. SPD arms control 
expert Egon Bahr argued that proceeding with the SDI would drive a wedge between the 
United States and Europe by creating a ''Fortress America."
143 
Throughout the next year, West German opposition to the Strategic Defense 
Initiative increased, most obviously through the statements of Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher (FDP) and Defense Minister Worner (CDU). Genscher's main 
concerns were the possible harmful effects on East-West relations and the impact on arms 
control efforts. Following an SDI briefing by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger in April1984, Womer was openly critical of the technological feasibility of 
143Christoph Bluth, "SDI: the Challenge to West Germany," International Affairs 62, no. 2 
(Spring 1986): 247-248. 
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the program, and argued that achieving perfect ballistic missile defense was an 
impossibility. The result, according to Worner, of partially effective missile defenses 
deployed by both sides would be an increase in tension, accompanied by an accelerating 
arms race. As HMD technology developed, the United States and Soviet Union would 
experience an increase in security, while Europe would become less secure. For Worner, 
the sharing of risk through equal insecurity was one of the strongest bonds of the NATO 
Alliance and the removal of that equality placed in jeopardy the cohesion of the 
Ailiance. 144 Instead, Worner advocated a U.S.-Soviet agreement to ban weapons from 
space. 
Additionally, in April 1984 all five parties in the Bundestag openly opposed 
Washington's SDI plans. As Elizabeth Pond noted in the Christian Science Monitor: 
what brings these otherwise divergent politicians together is a conviction 
that the Reagan administration's plans for space-based weapons would harm 
the West more than the Soviet Union -- and fatally decouple West 
European from American defense. 145 
As happened in Great Britain, however, political and economic factors began to take hold 
in West Germany and the unanimous opposition to the SDI began to crumble. 
2. A New German Approach 
By the Summer of 1984, outright criticism and opposition to the U.S. Strategic 
Defense Initiative had ceased, and the German Federal Security Council discussed the 
U.S. program in greater detail. The result was a recommendation that shifted the West 
German government to a more cooperative, less hostile, approach to the SDI. Two 
144 Ibid., 248. 
145 Elizabeth Pond, "Europe Fears 'Star Wars' May Destroy, Not Defend West," Christian 
Science Monitor, 12 April, 1984, p. 30. 
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factors may have influenced this shift in policy. First, the strong U.S. commitment to the 
research program suggested that further negative rhetoric could weaken the U.S. -German 
relationship. In contrast, support for the SDI would reinforce the bond between the two 
allies which had been enhanced by the recent INF deployment. Second, West German 
realization of the U.S. financial commitment to the SDI research program may have 
tempted the government with the possibility of technological and economic benefits. 
146 
Defense Minister Worner first relayed this new position during a press conference 
in-Washington, D. C. on 12 July 1984. At this time he offered qualified support to U.S. 
SDI research, but emphasized the conditions of that support. If effective missile defenses 
became technologically feasible, the defensive shield would have to protect the European 
allies, in addition to U.S. territory. Just as the U.S. nuclear deterrent had extended over 
Europe, any replacement system had to ensure the equality of security in order to prevent 
the "decoupling" of American and European defense. 
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3. The German Position Defined 
A more detailed foundation of the West German position emerged in October 
1984 in a paper on ballistic missile defense issued by the Bundestag Caucus of Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl's ruling Christian Democratic party. While more cooperative in nature than 
previous statements, the position paper suggested six main concerns of the CDU. The 
points addressed were: 
1.) American research into ballistic missile defense was necessary because 
of heavy Soviet research efforts in this field; 
2.) This research should be regarded, not as a prelude to future U.S.--
146 David Yost, "Western Europe and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative," 300. 
147 Brauch, "Europe and Strategic Defense," 295. 
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Soviet competition in testing and deployment of space weapons, but rather 
as a positive contribution to arms control (i.e., an inducement for Soviet 
reductions of nuclear weapons); 
3.) The Caucus said it was skeptical that deployment of defensive systems 
would end the arms race between the United States and Soviet Union, and 
therefore that research as such could not replace nuclear deterrence; 
4.) However, if effective defenses appeared feasible in the future, Europeans 
must have equal protection with the United States if the Alliance was not to 
suffer. There should be no differences in vulnerability between alliance 
partners. Any defense must also deal with shorter-range Soviet systems and 
must take into account the conventional imbalance in favor of the Soviets; 
5.) The United States must consult with the Western Europeans at each step 
of development and the Western Europeans must participate fully in research, 
and; 
6.) The effects of the research program on the ABM Treaty must be carefully 
considered. 148 
These principles served as the framework for West German policy over the next few years 
and the themes resurfaced repeatedly in the policy statements of German officials. 
Defense Minister Worner frequently addressed the first point in interviews, 
lectures, and articles. Describing the U.S. SDI research program as '1he necessary and 
legitimate response to Soviet endeavours in the field of offensive and defensive 
systems,"149 and reiterating that '1he Soviets have continued energetic work on anti-
missile defenses,"150 Worner attempted to justify any West German involvement to both 
domestic critics of the SDI, and to the Soviet Union itself Links to the West and its 
policies of cooperation with the East placed West Germany in a position in which support 
148 Dean, 103-104. 
149 Manfred Womer, lecture given at Royal United Services Institute on 27 November 1985, 
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for the U.S. research initiative had to be couched in terms which were justifiable to the 
Soviet Union. Hans Ruhle, head of the planning staff in the Ministry of Defense, echoed 
these arguments. For Ruhle, Soviet research efforts were the stimulus for the American 
program, although his support for the SDI stopped short of the objectives sought by the 
Americans. Rather than eliminating the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, Ruhle believed 
SDI could improve strategic stability by discouraging a Soviet first strike.
151 The 
originality of this position is emphasized by the fact that U.S. statements never discussed 
Soviet programs until after Western Germany used this argument. At no point in 1983 or 
1984 were Soviet developments used as a rationale for the U.S. Strategic Defense 
Initiative. 
Arms control efforts had always been an important component of West German 
policy, and the second point raised by the Caucus framed SDI in exactly those terms. 
Chancellor Kohl, in a February 1985 speech in Munich, cautiously introduced the West 
German position by defending the research-oriented nature of the program and by 
sUggesting that it was a powerful incentive for the Soviets to negotiate arms control 
agreements. 152 By April 1985, arms control talks between the United States and Soviet 
Union were proceeding in Geneva, and Horst Teltschik, director for security and 
international relations in the Office of the Chancellor of West Germany, credited the SDI 
for achieving political results, even in its developmental form. 
153 There was not 
unanimous agreement on this point, however, and Foreign Minister Genscher (FDP) firmly 
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believed that the SDI would erode the stability between East and West, while damaging 
any chances for arms controL Throughout 1985, the main consensus of the West German 
government remained one of support for the SDI program, providing it remained in the 
research phase and was ultimately aimed at improving arms control conditions, rather than 
deployment. 
The third point insisted on the maintenance of a deterrence strategy and was 
predicated on a general European assumption that developing defenses would not lead to 
the abandonment of offensive research. Rather, it was believed that a U.S.-Soviet 
offensive arms race would be the direct result of deploying defensive capabilities, as each 
side attempted to overwhelm enhanced capabilities. For this reason the nuclear deterrence 
strategy had to remain intact. This argument appeared to oppose the founding objective 
of the SDI, replacing deterrence with defense, yet at roughly the same time, the United 
States was revising its goals. The SDI would strengthen the U.S. deterrent policy in the 
short and medium terms, while population defense would be a long-term goal (see chapter 
II for greater detail). This shift in U.S. policy was entirely consistent with the goals of the 
West German government. 
The fourth point of the CDU Caucus represented the two core concerns of the 
West German government: the potential "decoupling" ofU.S. and European defense and 
the Soviet Union's overwhelming conventional superiority. Even while moving towards 
approval of the U.S. research program, the anxieties expressed during the earlier period of 
disapproval were still evident in December 1984. Support for the SDI remained 
contingent on the ability to guarantee a common defense which would maintain Alliance 
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cohesion. West German political and military leaders were particularly sensitive to the 
fact that the SDI would provide no defense against nuclear artillery, cruise missiles, or 
other delivery methods. The ability of the Soviet Union to wage a nuclear war on Western 
Europe, and West Germany in particular, would remain, even as technological 
developments led to a fool-proof shield over the United States. 
If the time ever arrived when nuclear deterrence was replaced by effective 
defenses, it was apparent that conventional force structure would become an even greater 
concern. The Social Democrats offered this as one of their prime arguments against the 
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, in terms of funding for the research program. In a 
statement by the SDP's Parliamentary Group, the opposition party suggested that: 
even now it can be foreseen that the funds for SDI cannot be made available 
from new sources, but will largely be diverted from current items in the 
defense budget.. .. The resources needed for strengthening NATO's 
conventional defence posture--the Alliance's declared target in the years 
ahead--will then no longer be available. However, if SDI is implemented 
it is precisely NATO's conventional capabilities that acquire particular 
significance. The elimination of the central strategic nuclear threat would 
result in the conventional imbalance against NATO making itself fully felt.
154 
The opposition party was more explicit, but the ruling coalition shared similar concerns. 
West German realization of the U.S. commitment to the SDI made European 
cooperation essential ifEurope hoped to influence the U.S. program. The Caucus 
expressed the importance ofU.S. consultation with West European leaders due to a belief 
that the SDI could have a profound effect on the security ofNATO as a whole. Alliance 
partners, according to the Caucus, should share responsibility in future decision-making on 
154 Bluth, 259. 
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testing and deployment. Participating in the research portion of SDI was important for 
two reasons. First, like the need to avoid "decoupling" of U.S. and European defense, 
Chancellor Kohl pointed out in his February 1985 Munich speech that Europe should 
avoid being ''technologically decoupled."155 U.S. research without European participation 
would widen an already noticeable technological gap within the Alliance, and participation 
was crucial to ensure Europe's technological advancement. Second, U.S. funding for 
research could have positive effects on West Germany's technological business sector. A 
Ministry of Defense report had identified eleven areas of research in which West German 
companies could potentially compete for contract dollars, and West German industry had 
a competitive advantage in five ofthose. 156 
The final point of the Caucus emphasized the continuing, strong West German 
support for the ABM Treaty. Nearly every public comment, or governmental policy 
statement throughout 1985 made it clear that the ABM Treaty was more valuable than the 
SDI research program. On 28 February 1985, the coalition ruling parties issued a joint 
statement that stressed that ''the ABM Treaty should be fully maintained." On 27 March 
1985, the federal government stressed ''that the ABM Treaty should be strengthened as 
long as no other common agreement can be reached." Additionally, the German Defense 
White Paper of June 1985 stated that, "in the short and medium term the observance of 
the ABM Treaty would take precedence" over alternative proposals. 157 Commitment to 
the principles of the treaty was consistent with West Germany's tendency to favor arms 
155 Wilson, A17. 
156 Bluth, 262. 
157 Brauch, 175-177. 
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control efforts. The possibility that the SDI could destabilize East-West relations by 
challenging the ABM Treaty remained a major concern of the West German government. 
The two clearest expressions ofWest German policy towards ballistic missile 
defense and the Strategic Defense Initiative emerged in March and April1985. On 27 
March 1985, the West German government issued a statement which outlined the 
conditions for support of the U.S. initiative. The statement encouraged the need to work 
towards the development of a more stable relationship between the superpowers, 
recommended strengthening the ABM Treaty, and warned against an arms race in space. 
Flexible response had to be maintained as an Alliance strategy, and political and military 
risk-sharing had to remain an essential component of Alliance cohesion. Finally, the 
statement suggested that Europe should strive to reach a common position on the SDI.
158 
On 18 April1985 Chancellor Kohl presented the government's position in the Bundestag. 
Describing the SDI program as 'justified, politically necessary, and in the interest of 
overall Western security," Kohl reiterated the need to maintain a deterrence strategy, West 
German support for arms control and the ABM Treaty, and the need for participation in 
research '1:o preserve and increase their influence on the future evolution of the SDI."
159 
Debate within the government delayed a decision on West German participation in 
research until December 1985. Foreign Minister Genscher and the FDP reportedly played 
a role in limiting the government's involvement to lessen the damage to relations with the 
East. These conditions reportedly included: technology transfer guarantees, no direct 
government involvement in research with no involvement beyond research, and no 
158 Ibid., 174. 
159 Yost, "Western Europe and ... ", 300-301. 
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financial support for research. 160 Economics Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP) was 
appointed chief negotiator to reach an agreement between the two governments, and his 
appointment emphasized the technological and economic aspects of German involvement 
in SDI, while downplaying its strategic significance. A formal agreement was reached in 
March 1986, and West Germany became the second ally, behind Great Britain, to accept 
participation in SDI research. 
C. GERMANY AND BMD IN THE POST -COLD WAR ERA 
While the British and French governmental policies towards HMD in the 1990s 
remain difficult to define, German attitudes towards missile defense are clearer. At the 
same time, the issue itself appears as only a minor aspect of German security policy, and 
BMD has generated an insignificant amount of debate in the last six years. Compared to 
the political opposition and difficulties experienced during the SDI period, missile defense 
in Germany, at least theater missile defense, has become a quietly accepted policy, 
allowing greater attention, energy, and financial resources to be focused on matters of 
greater importance. Security to the east of Germany and reunification occupy the majority 
of the government's attention, leaving BMD a topic of little interest. 
1. Significant German Preoccupations 
The growing Mediterranean threat has not developed in a similar context within 
Germany, as it has within other NATO countries such as France. The threat from that 
region has been identified, but the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact left German attention focused on Central Europe rather than Middle East or 
160 Ibid., 302. 
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Mediterranean. Security policy, as a component of foreign policy, involves German 
efforts to drive the potential of conflict eastward, away from their own border. U.S.- and 
German-led efforts to push for NATO expansion are a concrete demonstration of this 
desire. Germany no longer wishes to be the front-line state in any potential East-West 
conflict, and the cultivation of improved security and economic relations with eastern 
neighbors remains today the main focus of German security policy. 
Germany's primary preoccupation remains the reconstruction of the unified nation. 
The contrast between East and West Germany at the time of reunification was stark, and it 
was clear that vast resources would be needed to ensure the successful transformation. By 
emphasizing domestic needs, foreign policy concerns have assumed a lesser role for 
Germany. Hans Ruhle noted that "unless something extraordinary happens, Germany for 
the next ten to fifteen years will focus almost its entire attention on completing the 'inner 
unity' of the nation."161 Ballistic missile defenses do not amount to an "extraordinary" 
occurrence in Germany, and have not been an issue that would draw attention away from 
domestic reconstruction. 
2. Factors Leading to BMD Support 
What little discussion that has arisen concerning missile defense is founded on 
three security policy issues: the validity and relevance of extended deterrence in the post-
Cold War period, the constitutional approval of German "out of area" operations, and the 
need to replace the outdated Hawk air defense system with one capable of meeting a 
variety of airborne threats, including tactical ballistic missiles. In each case, it has been 
161 Hans Riihle, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A German View, Comparative Strategy 12, no. 1 
(January-March 1993): 83. 
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less a debate about BMD, than a general acceptance of the principle of defense and a 
question of how best to proceed given increasingly stringent budget restrictions. 
Extended deterrence became an issue in Germany as early as 1990, following 
NATO's London Declaration. During that meeting, NATO ministers agreed to a 
fundamental shift in NATO nuclear policy, by stating that it was changing its strategy of 
flexible response and that ''by reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons, NATO in the new 
Europe will adopt a new strategy making its nuclear forces truly weapons of last 
resort."162 By removing nuclear weapons as an integral aspect ofNATO's strategy and 
declaring their use to be one of"last resort," the extended deterrence which had protected 
non-nuclear Germany was seemingly removed. 163 If that were the case, Germany would 
need to consider an alternative means of defense. 
More directly relevant to German interests is the perception that extended 
deterrence from the United States has eroded since the end of the Cold War. Historically, 
the reality of extended deterrence and American willingness to commit to a nuclear 
exchange in the defense of Germany has always been difficult to prove. The INF debate, 
for example, was largely an attempt to reemphasize U.S. commitment to nuclear 
deterrence in defense of Europe, and particularly Germany. Now, a strategy of deterrence 
based on strategic nuclear weapons has become even more difficult to demonstrate 
effectively. In 1992, three German observers indicated that the strategy of the Cold War: 
cannot be in Germany's security interest. Such a strategy would not only 
require an entirely unrealistic and undesirable degree of U.S. self-
162 
"NATO Transformed: The London Declaration," Selected Document No. 38, Department of 
State, Washington D.C., 6 July 1990, 1. 
163 Holger Mey and Andrew Denison, "View From Germany: France's Nuclear Tests and 
Germany's Nuclear Interests," Comparative Strategy 15, no. 2 (April-June 1996): 171. 
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commitment, but would also narrow the range ofU. S. military, and hence, 
political freedom of action in a way which is incompatible with maintaining 
alliances worldwide. 164 
The new security environment and the diversity of threats to Germany have negatively 
affected the credibility of extended deterrence and forced the German government to 
reconsider how it will defend military forces, citizens, and territory. Missile defenses are 
believed to be one possible replacement. 
The second reason that missile defenses, particularly theater missile defenses, were 
gl-adually accepted by the German government was the increasing use of German defense 
forces beyond the boundaries of the German state. Since the end of the Cold War 
Germany has recognized that its size and importance in the world require its participation 
in sharing responsibility for crisis management around the globe. German minesweepers 
were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991, and aircraft were provided to assist 
humanitarian aid efforts to the Kurds in northern Iraq. In 1992, 1,500 medics were in 
place in Cambodia in support ofU.N. operations, soon followed by 1,700 armed soldiers 
in Somalia. From 1993 to 1995 Germany incrementally increased its role in the ex-
Yugoslavia crisis, and it was in 1994 that the German constitutional court ruled that the 
Bundeswehr could legally be sent abroad, provided the Bundestag approved of the 
deployment. 165 
164 Thomas Enders, Holger Mey, and Michael RUhle, "The New Germany and Nuclear 
Weapons," in Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Eurone. Asia. and North 
America. (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 134-135. 
165 Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power," Washington Quarterly 19, 
no. 1 (Winter 1996): downloaded from Lexis Nexis server. 
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As the army reorganized, it developed the Krisenreaktionskrafte (KRK), a 37,000-
strong crisis reaction force designed specifically to meet the growing emphasis of"out of 
area" operations. 166 In support ofNATO and Western European Union (WEU) 
operations, or in connection with U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, 
German forces could find themselves deployed within reach of short range ballistic 
missiles. In light of such deployments, it became increasingly important to provide a 
defensive capability to defend those forces. Additionally, the variety of missions and 
governing authorities (NATO, WEU, U.N.) makes it uncertain that U.S. TMD capabilities 
would always be present to provide that defense. Therefore, the German government 
recognized the need to develop or purchase a TiviD system to protect deployed troops. 
To emphasize this growing requirement, the 1994 German defense white paper 
indicated that: 
the increasing proliferation in crisis areas oflong-range missiles that can also 
be equipped with weapons of mass destruction and the emerging capability of 
foreign forces to use them as a threat to parts of Europe and Germany or 
Allied forces during operations call for the build-up of a tactical missile defense 
capability. 167 
One course that Germany is pursuing in this field is the planned purchase of the upgraded 
Patriot, PAC-3 missile, as soon as U.S. forces are equipped. The current five-year defense 
plan includes funding for the upgraded missiles and the purchase would be an extension of 
the twelve year relationship between Germany and the Patriot. 168 Originally purchased as 
166 Kathleen Bunten, "From Conscripts to Crisis Reaction Forces," Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 
March 1996, p. 24. 
167 1994 German Defense White Paper, para. 577. 
168 
"Germany Plans Buy ofPAC-3 Missiles," Aerospace Daily, 16 October 1996, p. 82. 
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an air defense system, the German government pursued the Patriot upgrade, partially in 
response to the TMD capabilities displayed during the GulfWar. 
The second major German undertaking is the program to replace the obsolete 
Hawk air defense system. Early discussions on the replacement system led to a decision 
that any Hawk successor would need to possess the capability to defend against short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles in addition to aircraft and other air -breathing threats. The 
initial German concept, named Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem (TL VS), 169 soon 
merged with the U.S. Army's Corps-SAM TMD program and became the MEADS 
program. After bilateral negotiations France and Italy expressed interest in MEADS and 
the program became a multinational venture, with the intent to split project funding 
between the four participants. Negotiations continued until spring 1996 when France 
indicated it would be unable to participate due to budget constraints, forcing a 
reexamination of program expenses by the remaining three partners. To date, MEADS 
continues to move forward and represents a substantial commitment by the German 
government to TMD development and support for U.S. BMD research. 
3. Budget Constraints 
Like other Western European nations, Germany is facing pressure to cut, rather 
than increase, defense spending. France's budget difficulties forced its withdrawal from 
MEADS, while Great Britain has been hesitant to commit scarce resources to BMD 
programs before clearly defining its national requirements. In July 1996 the German 
cabinet reduced the 1997 defense budget to 46.6 billion Deutsche marks ($30.4 billion), a 
169 Holger Mey, "View From Germany: Extended Air Defense--Germany Between European and 
Transatlantic Orientations," Comparative Strategy, 14, no. 1 (January-March 1995): 82. 
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500 million mark reduction from the 1996 budget, and a 1.5 billion mark reduction from 
the original1997 forecast. 170 While German missile defense programs faced no immediate 
cuts, the budget reduction portends that future limitations may not be out of the question. 
Hans Ruhle, in 1993, warned of this trend, by predicting that "military threats, of whatever 
kind, are being replaced by finances as the only remaining determinant for basic decisions 
on security policy."171 Whether or not budget considerations override security concerns 
and missile defense requirements remains to be seen in the coming years. 
D. SUMMARY 
In the three years between President Reagan's March 1983 speech and the signing 
of a participation agreement, the West German government grappled with a number of 
major political and strategic issues. Its vulnerable geographic position between East and 
West and its reliance on the U.S. strategic arsenal for deterrence were challenged with the 
U.S. decision to pursue strategic missile defenses. Efforts to maintain smooth relations 
with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries while supporting its U.S. partner led the 
West German government to produce an understandably ambiguous policy on the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. The conditional nature of its support allowed West Germany 
to maintain, according to Christoph Bluth, "an intrinsically skeptical, almost hostile 
attitude to President Reagan's approach ... but allowed itself enough room for manoeuvre 
to participate in the research process and reap whatever economic and technological 
benefits might come its way."172 Political fears of increased East-West tensions and 
170 de Briganti, "Bonn Trims Defense Budget," Defense News, 15-21 July 1996, p. 2. 
171 Riihle, 82. 
172 Bluth, 250. 
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strategic fears of"decoupling" blended with economic desires and Alliance pressures to 
produce a West German policy which never fully endorsed the fundamental objectives of 
the SDI, but never fully disavowed them either. 
Since reunification, Germany has been preoccupied with reconstructing a unified 
nation and establishing greater security on its eastern border. At the same time, it has 
taken an important step in exercising global influence through its use of the Bundeswehr 
beyond its own borders. The increased threat to deployed forces and its own territory and 
the perceived weakness of the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee have resulted in a 
general acceptance of the need for missile defenses, at least on a limited scale. The 
opposition present during the "Star Wars" debate has evaporated, but has been replaced 
with minimal support, indicative of the energy devoted to other issues. While the German 
government's actions with the MEADS program and Patriot upgrades suggest 
commitment in this area of defense, the unenthusiastic support and possible budgetary 
constraints may lead to a reduction in future German B:MD development. BMD 
cooperation between the United States and Germany currently exists, but the bond is not 




A. THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis examines ballistic missile defense and how it affects the relationship 
between the United States and other members of the Atlantic Alliance. The central 
argument is that the development of missile defense has been, and continues to be, a major 
source of friction among NATO members. This friction has the potential to weaken 
Alliance relations; it might erode the level of transatlantic cooperation. Interestingly, the 
end of the Cold War did little to reduce the difficulty of developing a common NATO 
policy that member states can uniformly support. The major strategic differences that 
fueled the debate during the Cold War are gone, however, and the nature of the problem 
has changed. Economic constraints and difficulty in adapting Cold War assets and policies 
to the new security environment are the new impediments to a unified BMD strategy. 
To demonstrate how divisive an issue BMD was within the Alliance during the 
Cold War this thesis assesses the interaction between the United States and three NATO 
partners during the Strategic Defense Initiative debate in the 1980s. To determine the 
nature of the relationship in the post-Cold War era the opinions, statements, and BMD 
policies of each country over the last six years were surveyed. The discussion of the two 
periods makes it apparent that efforts by the United States to pursue missile defense 
development contributed to the increased level of tension between the allies, placing 
strains on NATO cohesion. 
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B. THESIS FINDINGS 
During the Cold War, the United States made a number of major policy decisions 
regarding ballistic missile defense without consulting its allies, or considering the possible 
effects on the security of those allies. The 1967 Sentinel announcement was the first 
major U.S. decision to deploy a BMD system to protect U.S. urban-industrial centers, 
reportedly against a growing Chinese threat. The administration argued that it would have 
no impact on the strategic balance with the Soviet Union, but others argued that any BMD 
would adversely affect the U.S.-Soviet stability. European partners remained quiet 
following this announcement, offering little overt criticism, and even less open support for 
the U.S. initiative. The Sentinel system posed problems, though, for European allies 
attempting to promote better relations with the Soviet Union. 
A U.S. policy more acceptable to the Europeans was the 1972 ABM Treaty 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty limited BMD capabilities to 
guarantee the integrity ofU.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The intention of the treaty 
was to remove the need for continued offensive force expansion by maintaining strategic 
effectiveness and a policy of mutually assured destruction. Ideally, the treaty would 
enable both sides to negotiate offensive arms reductions while ensuring the vulnerability 
provided by the limitation of defensive systems. European support was linked to the 
adherence to the MAD model and the preservation of a nuclear deterrence strategy to 
ensure peace in Europe. As well, European allies welcomed arms control initiatives and 
led efforts to foster continued open dialogue with Soviet counterparts. 
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The U.S. policy built on the ABM Treaty was challenged by President Reagan's 
announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. His decision to make nuclear 
weapons "impotent and obsolete" threatened the stability achieved under the nuclear 
deterrence strategy of the previous thirty years, and signaled a renewal of confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. The program also signaled an increase in unease between the 
United States and its three most important NATO partners, particularly when the United 
States sought not only their approval, but cooperation. Great Britain, France, and 
Germany each spent the next three years struggling to define policies related to the SDI 
which would minimize damage to Alliance cohesion, while protecting the stability of the 
previous decade. 
The British government had three primary concerns which made cooperation with 
the United States difficult. First, SDI threatened the ABM Treaty, which guaranteed the 
viability of the British independent strategic arsenal. For the British, nuclear deterrence, 
and their contribution to it, offered stability in Europe and deterred the possibility of 
conventional Soviet aggression. Second, British policy makers had more faith in political 
dialogue than in the development of technological defenses to improve stability between 
East and West. Third, the British supported continued arms control efforts, and feared 
that SDI would remove that option and instead lead to an offensive arms race. Eventually, 
the British government agreed to participate in the research in order to reap the economic 
benefits, prevent a widening technological gap, and as a means to demonstrate Alliance 
loyalty. Its support for the program was always extremely limited, though, and the British 
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government never agreed with the strategic goals of the United States. For the British, 
SDI was a reckless U.S. decision, made without consideration of the impact on allies. 
The French opposed the Strategic Defense Initiative from the outset and never 
altered that opposition. The heart of the matter for France was the threat SDI posed to 
the deterrence strategy, a key component of French national security policy. By negating 
deterrence, the U.S. initiative would threaten the unique position of France, which 
perceived itself as offering its own autonomous European defense. With the value of its 
mdependent nuclear arsenal diminished, the weakness of the French conventional force 
would become evident, resulting in a lesser position for France in European politics. The 
overt French criticism of the U.S. program and the efforts to unify Europe against the 
United States further damaged the cohesion of the Alliance and forced other members to 
choose between France's call for European solidarity and transatlantic cooperation. Either 
choice had an adverse effect on relations between the allies. 
Without a strategic deterrent of its own, West Germany had relied on an extended 
deterrence guarantee by the United States to prevent Soviet nuclear or conventional 
aggression. SDI placed that guarantee in jeopardy, and the West German government 
feared the instability that the U.S. program would cause. Additionally, West Germany 
was concerned that SDI would mean the decoupling.ofU.S. and European security 
interests through the creation of a ''Fortress America," secure in the knowledge that it 
could survive a Soviet missile strike. More than any other European country, West 
Germany sought to improve relations with the Soviet bloc, and SDI promised to disrupt 
efforts to enhance that dialogue. Like the British, the German government eventually 
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offered limited support to the U.S. program, but never endorsed SDI's fundamental 
objectives. 
For all three countries the Strategic Defense Initiative was troubling in its apparent 
impact on nuclear deterrence, a strategy with which the Europeans were comfortable. In 
the minds of the Europeans, nuclear deterrence had provided stability in the region, had 
deterred conventional conflict, and had made up for the conventional force imbalance of 
NATO. Arms control was possible, and improved relations with the Soviet Union 
stiggested that peaceful coexistence in the European theater was a genuine possibility. 
With its unilateral policy, the United States failed to consider the response of its allies or 
the impact SDI would have on NATO strategic planning. As a result, allied support was 
weak, cooperation was minimal, and Alliance cohesion suffered. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has refined its BMD program to 
meet an emerging, more limited, threat, in response to the proliferation ofWMD and 
ballistic missiles. Current administration goals emphasize TMD while restraining the more 
robust NMD systems. The Clinton administration promotes adherence to the ABM 
Treaty, although efforts continue to formally define a demarcation line between TMD and 
B.MD systems. (An effort some suggest undermines the essence of the treaty.) Compared 
to the ambitious objectives of SDI, the missile defense goals of the United States in the 
post-Cold War period are minimal, and the lack of a Soviet threat suggests that European 
allies might be more amenable to the concept ofB.MD. While it is true that NATO has 
moved forward in accepting the basic principles ofTMD, the actions of its member states 
indicate that no cooperative policy will be reached soon. 
113 
Great Britain has acknowledged that missile defense may be an answer to a 
growing threat from "rogue states." As one of the most important capitals in Europe, 
London is sure to figure high on the list of targets for a potential adversary. In addition, 
the British remain one of the most likely allies to deploy troops in support ofNATO- or 
U.N.-sanctioned missions. For these reasons, possessing TMD capabilities should be a 
high priority for the British government to guarantee that it remains free to act and does 
not become paralyzed due to vulnerability. Yet the British government has been slow to 
commit to the development of any type of missile defense, and instead initiated a two year 
study to clarify its needs. In the meantime, the British government has indicated that it 
relies on its Trident submarine force t<? provide a nuclear deterrent against potential 
aggression. When the results of the BMD study define the needs of Great Britain, the next 
significant hurdle will be for the government to find the budget resources to pay for 
development and deployment. 
Similarly, France is wary of the missile threat from the Middle East and 
Mediterranean regions, and has indicated that missile defense may provide security. At the 
same time, France has undertaken a review of several major policies, and fewer weapons 
platforms will be developed due to reductions in defense spending. France's withdrawal 
from the MEADS project, perhaps the most positive symbol of Alliance cooperation on 
BMD, is illustrative of the difficult choices France must make. Like Great Britain, France 
has returned to its independent nuclear arsenal as a means to deter a missile attack against 
deployed French troops of French territory. 
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Of the three allies discussed in this thesis, Germany has demonstrated the most 
cooperation with the United States in the post-Cold War period. The need to protect "out 
of area" troops, the update of the Hawk air defense system, and the weakness of U.S. 
extended deterrence guarantees were all important factors in Germany's decision to 
pursue more advanced BMD capabilities. Still, the overall lack of interest in the subject 
suggests that the German commitment may go only so far and that reunification and 
NATO expansion continue to be issues of far greater importance. Missile defense escaped 
a recent round of defense budget cuts, but its security in years to come is difficult to 
determine. 
In the post-Cold War period, then, the United States and its NATO allies continue 
to have difficulty pursuing common BMD policies that support the overall goals of 
NATO. The very limited sanction by NATO to develop TMD only for deployed troops is 
indicative of the problems which still exist. These problems will continue to divide the 
Alliance in other areas. If Europeans are unable to commit resources to develop TMD 
systems, they are likely to have a more difficult time deploying forces to a region within 
range of an aggressor equipped with ballistic missiles or WMD. Or, if an aggressor is 
capable of attacking a defenseless Paris or Bonn, for example, France or Germany may be 
more hesitant to support U.S. or NATO military action. In either case, the inability of the 
United States and its allies to reach a consensus on BMD threatens to weaken the ability 
ofNATO to operate effectively. To strengthen cohesion of the Alliance, the United States 
must express greater consideration for the needs of its allies, and European member states 
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